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ABSTRACT
Alexander H. H. Stuart was active in Virginia and
American politics from the 1830s to the 1880s. As a
prominent leader in the Whig, Know-Nothing, and Conservative 
parties, he pursued a political and social agenda founded 
upon the tenets of Whig philosophy. Devotion to Whiggery and 
its later manifestations characterized his career. As a 
spokesman for the Know-Nothings, Stuart wrote a series of 
published letters during the presidential campaign of 1856
which eloquently represented the moderate elements of a party
noted for its virulent anti-Catholicism and opposition to 
foreign immigration.
Stuart served in both houses of the Virginia General 
Assembly, in the United States House of Representatives, and 
as secretary of the interior. In all of these offices, and 
as a delegate to Virginiafs secession convention in 1861, he 
stood for support of the Union in the face of the mounting 
secession crisis. His greatest recognition, however, came 
from his involvement with small, influential political 
groups, organized to deal with specific situations. The most 
famous of these was the Committee of Nine, which Stuart 
chaired in 1869. An outgrowth of the "New Movement" which 
united white Conservatives and moderate Republicans during 
Reconstruction in Virginia, the Committee of Nine was 
instrumental in securing the return of the state to the 
Union. Stuart played a key role in its activities.
This thesis is an overview of Alexander H. H. Stuart's 
political career, with special emphasis on his influence as 
spokesman for the Know-Nothings in 1856 and as leader of the 
Committee of Nine during Virginia's Reconstruction. Its goal 
is to demonstrate that Stuart may fairly be considered, in 
the words of one historian, "the great unappreciated man of 
Virginia history."
"THE GREAT UNAPPRECIATED MAN:"
A POLITICAL PROFILE OF ALEXANDER H. H. STUART OF VIRGINIA
INTRODUCTION
In reviewing a biography of Alexander H. H. Stuart, the
historian Hamilton J. Eckenrode referred to him as "the great
1
unappreciated man of Virginia history." Stuart's life and 
political career spanned the years during which the United 
States grew into a great nation. He lived during the 
administrations of 21 Presidents of the United States, from 
Jefferson to Benjamin Harrison. At his birth in 1807, there 
were 15 states in the Union; by his death in 1891, the number 
had risen to 44. During his lifetime the American nation 
wrestled with the question of black slavery, subdued the 
native Indians, and fought wars with Great Britain, Mexico, 
and itself.
In 50 years of public service, Stuart participated in 
the political process as a state legislator, member of 
congress, cabinet secretary, and as an influential member of 
some of the most prominent political movements of the 
nineteenth century. His contemporaries included Henry Clay 
and Daniel Webster, leading lights of the Whig party who 
helped define his political identity; Millard Fillmore, whom 
Stuart served as secretary of the interior; Henry A. Wise, 
his frequent opponent in the arena of Virginia politics; 
Robert E. Lee, for whom Stuart authored the politically 
significant "White Sulphur Springs letter" during 
Reconstruction; and Robert M. T. Hunter and William Mahone,
2
3men of different backgrounds and political persuasions with 
whom Stuart was alternately allied or at odds through the 
years. Stuart himself often eschewed the limelight occupied 
by these and other men, in favor of a behind-the-scenes role 
as an instigator, organizer, and executor of political 
operations. Despite this predilection, he was the 
personification of the "public man" of his era.
Stuart belongs to that group of men who stand on the
periphery of history; men who have wielded great influence on
people and events, but whose accomplishments go largely
unrecognized or unremembered. It has been nearly a century
since his death, and in that time only one attempt has been
made to chronicle his life, a biography written by his son-
in-law Alexander F. Robertson. Published in 1925, this book
is useful for information regarding Stuart's early life and
personality, given the author's firsthand experience with the
subject. However, Robertson's work does not draw upon
documentary evidence other than some of Stuart's personal
papers and a small collection of public documents, and
contains no scholarly notes or bibliographic information.
Despite this paucity of primary and secondary sources, and
the book's filiopietistic tone, Robertson's biography has
been the only published study of Stuart's life and work for
more than sixty years. As such, it is often the only work
2
about him consulted by historians of the period.
4This thesis is not intended as a comprehensive biography 
of Stuart. It is instead an overview of his political 
career. Within the context of his fifty years in public 
life, I have concentrated especially on two episodes in 
Stuart’s career, each of which highlight his involvement in a 
controversial public debate. These are his role as a 
spokesman for the American or Know-Nothing party in Virginia 
during the 1856 presidential election campaign, and his 
involvement with the "New Movement," the eclectic Whig- 
Republican coalition which set the stage for the "redemption" 
of the Old Dominion in 1870. The situations in both 
instances involved Virginia political issues that had 
national implications. I have drawn upon primary source 
materials that include personal papers of Stuart and some of 
his contemporaries as well as public documents. In addition, 
I have made use of a large body of secondary works, most of 
which have been published since Robertson’s 1925 biography.
My goal in this thesis is to discuss Alexander H. H. 
Stuart as a politician who drew his inspiration and strength 
from the doctrines of the Whig party. It will be seen that 
Stuart took an active role in most of the great political 
questions facing Virginia and the nation in his day. 
Throughout his years in public life, he addressed these 
issues as a Whig, regardless of the name of the party with 
which he affiliated himself. Daniel Walker Howe has written 
of the "political culture" of Whiggery, demonstrating that it
5embodied a moral and intellectual philosophy in concert with 
political thought. The influence of this Whig culture is
3
evident in the political career of Alexander H. H, Stuart.
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CHAPTER I 
THE EVOLUTION OF A WHIG
Alexander Hugh Holmes Stuart was born in Staunton,
Virginia on April 2, 1807, the youngest child of Archibald
1
and Eleanor Briscoe Stuart. The Stuarts were one of 
Staunton's most distinguished families, having lived in the 
Augusta County area since the 1730's. One of their closest 
friends was Thomas Jefferson, who often visited them when in 
Staunton. The design of the Stuart home has traditionally 
been attributed to him, and one chamber has carried the 
sobriquet of the "Jefferson room" for generations. This 
splendid house still sits atop one of Staunton's many hills, 
looking much the way it did when a young lad, called "Sandy" 
by his family and friends, grew up there. Within this home, 
concepts of pride in his origins and community service were 
instilled in Sandy Stuart at an early age; they remained 
essential features of his character for the rest of his life.
Archibald Stuart was a familiar figure in the social and 
political circles of Virginia long before his son followed 
the same destiny. A veteran of the Revolution and one of the 
founders of Phi Beta Kappa at the College of William and 
Mary, the elder Stuart rose steadily through the ranks of the 
Commonwealth's political order after the war. He served in 
both houses of the General Assembly, was a delegate to the 
convention that ratified the United States Constitution in
8
91788, and received a general court judgeship from the 
Virginia Senate in 1800. He was also a member of the state 
constitutional convention of 1829-30. The elder Stuart 
had a profound influence on his son. It was a sketch of 
his fatherfs life that Alexander was working on when he died 
in 1891, at the age of 84.
After receiving his initial education at the 
Staunton Academy, young Stuart traveled to his father's alma 
mater, William and Mary, to further his studies. He read law 
at home for a year, and in 1827 entered the University of 
Virginia (unfortunately too late to enjoy the hospitality of 
the old family friend who had lived at Monticello). In 1828 
Alexander H. H. Stuart was admitted to the Staunton bar, and 
began his practice in the only place he would ever call home. 
Pleading cases before the general district court necessitated 
frequent travel throughout western Virginia, including much 
of what is now the eastern portion of the state of West 
Virginia. During these journeys, often lasting several 
weeks, Stuart formed personal and business contacts among the 
leading lawyers and politicians of his region, laying the 
foundation for a lifelong interest in the process of 
government within the Commonwealth. Long absences from home 
became more trying after 1833, when Stuart married his 
cousin, Frances Baldwin. Their union lasted more than fifty 
years and produced nine children. Stuart would outlive six
10
of them, however, and despite many professional achievements,
2
this personal tragedy was a burden he carried to his grave.
As the heir to a longstanding tradition of community 
involvement, it was natural that Stuart should become active 
in politics at an early age. An avid supporter of Henry 
Clay, the young lawyer helped organize meetings of men from 
around Staunton and Augusta County in 1832 to aid the 
Kentuckian in his bid for the Presidency. Later that year he 
went to Washington, D.C. as a delegate to the Young Men's 
National Convention, another gathering of Clay boosters.
Among the other Virginians attending the conference was a 
young army officer who was the same age as Stuart--Robert E. 
Lee.
In 1835 Stuart made the transition from involved voter 
to elected official, winning a seat in the House of 
Delegates. He ran as a Whig, fully embracing the party's 
message of economic progress and sectional conciliation. 
Stuart and the Whigs came upon the American political scene 
at virtually the same moment. The relationship between the 
two, forged in the hopeful vigor of youth, endured long after 
the organization itself ceased to exist. In the 1830's, 
however, Whiggery seemed to Stuart and his colleagues the 
answer to many the problems facing Virginia and the nation.
11
While an assortment of interests and objectives
motivated the men who united to form this new party, certain
philosophical constants emerged which serve to define the
’’typical Whig." A Whig believed in the need for order and
harmony in society. He acknowledged the necessity of popular
sovereignty in government, but asserted the socially
conservative doctrine that men of means and good family
should hold the reins of power. Politically, the Whigs
favored a curb in the powers of the executive, while
advocating a strong Congress as the agent of federal
direction. This manifested itself in a particularly emphatic
defense of the independence of the Senate. "Slow and
deliberative in its proceedings, the Senate was assigned by
the Whigs the function of checking the rashness of public
opinion, to which the popularly elected House was more
directly responsive." The statesman, rather than the
3
politician, embodied the Whig concept of leadership.
In economic issues, Whigs rallied to Henry Clay's 
American system, using it as the foundation of all subsequent 
policies. A national outlook, accompanied by a belief in the 
use of the federal government to benefit society, 
characterized Whig views of development and prosperity. A 
system of internal improvements, supported by the federal 
government, would provide vital commercial exchange and 
communication. High tariffs would protect American industry, 
and the resulting industrial population were to be sustained
12
by the farmers of the nation. Thus support for business,
banking, and other commercial interests also identified the 
4
Whig.
Alexander H. H. Stuart's family background, profession,
and personal temperament were such that he readily adhered to
the social and economic tenets of Whiggery in the General
Assembly. During his three years as a delegate he championed
the expansion of internal improvements in western Virginia,
and became chairman of the Committee of Roads and Internal
Navigation in 1838. As a Shenandoah Valley legislator, he
argued for the construction of railroads, canals, and
improved turnpikes in order to bring the agricultural and
mineral resources of the region to the eastern port cities.
Despite the advantage of a Whig majority in the
Assembly during the 1836, 1837, and 1838 sessions, and the
presence of another Whig, Littleton Waller Tazewell, in the
governor's mansion, few of Stuart's proposals for economic
development in the mountain/valley region were adopted. The
friction between East and West, between Democrats and Whigs,
continued to hamper efforts at sectional cooperation within
Virginia. Perhaps it was disillusionment over this situation
that caused Stuart to leave the House for a return to the
practice of law. It was certainly true that the demands of
office put a considerable financial strain on his family at 
5
this time.
13
Stuart was not long absent from the frontline of 
politics. In 1841, Whig leaders prevailed upon him to enter 
the race for the Sixth District congressional seat. Despite 
the fierce rivalry that existed between the Whigs and the 
Democracy, this race epitomized the "gentlemanly" approach to 
campaigning which at that time still existed in Stuart's part 
of Virginia. As he related many years later in an interview 
with the Staunton Vindicator;
My competitor, nominated by the Democrats, was James 
McDowell, of Rockbridge. He was a man of high tone, of 
great ability, and our families had been intimate for 
generations. The canvass was conducted on a plane of 
high courtesy, and at its close we were even better 
friends than at its beginning. The canvass between 
McDowell and myself lasted six weeks ... [it] would have 
been longer, but at its opening McDowell was absent in 
Mississippi. I waited a month for his return ...
6
Stuart won the election, and began his congressional
career by becoming involved in the "gag rule" controversy
within the House. Since 1836, parliamentary maneuvers had
prevented the introduction of any resolutions pertaining to
the containment or abolition of slavery. In his maiden House
speech, he proposed that the rules of the previous session be
adopted for organizational purposes, while a select
committee be appointed to review changes. This was Stuart *s
way of reaching a compromise over the "gag rule." His motion
was adopted on a vote (119-103) that split almost completely
7
along party lines.
14
While many Whig newspapers applauded Stuart’s
statesmanlike accomplishment (one called it "firm and yet
moderate, dignified and yet conciliatory”), the seemingly
transectional strength of the national parties expressed in
this vote was in fact eroding. As a southern Whig, Stuart
was hampered by the growing discord within his party. His
adherence to orthodox Whig doctrine did not conflict with the
needs of the people he represented, since his calls for
internal improvements and like measures won him the approval
of his western Virginia constituents. Likewise his arguments
in favor of national harmony were well received in an Upper
South state where support for the Union was strong. The
essential problem a Whig like Stuart faced was the same one
that later caused Georgia’s Alexander Stephens to leave the
party— the conflict between the antislavery tendencies of the
party’s northern wing and the proslavery stance of the 
8
South.
Some southern Whigs were vocal critics of the peculiar
institution. Their arguments, however, were founded less on
a concern over the moral wrongs of slavery than on the belief
that it was an obstacle to southern economic progress. They
stressed the need to demonstrate that their section could
offer the same potential for industrial and commercial
development exhibited by the North. So long as slavery
persisted, they asserted, such a demonstration was unlikely 
9
to take place.
15
Most southern Whigs, however, saw the situation
differently. The fundamental Whig desire for an orderly and
productive society would, in their view, be jeopardized by
any mass emancipation of the slaves. Furthermore, most Whigs
did not agree with the principle that slavery was an
unproductive form of labor. They neither condemned nor
challenged the system, but instead urged that the South
demonstrate to the North just how efficient and successful
slavery was. They also characterized industrialization of
the South as in the best interests of the planter class,
arguing that a more diversified economy would ease the
effects of poor staple crop years, and provide a larger
10
market for the section's produce.
Although there was a rather large strict states' rights 
element, drawn in large part from slaveholding planters, 
among the founders of the Whig party in the South, Charles 
Grier Sellers, Jr. has argued that Whiggery below Mason’s and 
Dixon's line "did not begin as and did not become a state 
rights party." Sellers describes the Whigs in the South as 
being concerned with many of the same issues that their 
northern counterparts were interested in--"mainly questions 
of banking and financial policy." He regarded the merchant 
and banking interests in the South as the core of Whig 
support, and declared that while traditionally associated 
with the states' rights policies of the planter class, 
southern Whigs in fact articulated the concerns of the small
16
but influential urban middle class, as well as lawyers and
11
stockholders in internal improvements projects.
Thomas Brown, in his contribution to Politics and
Statesmanship; Essays on the American Whig Party, takes issue
with Sellers' interpretation of southern Whiggery. Brown
agrees that Whigs in the South shared common concerns with
their colleagues in the North— "fear of unrestrained
executive power, abhorrence at [President Andrew] Jackson's
perceived lawlessness, and revulsion against corrupt party
influence— " but points out that "preservation of state
sovereignty and the protection of slavery" set the
southerners apart. He also shows Clay's influence within the
southern wing of the party as the symbol of sectional
12
conciliation, a cornerstone of Whiggery everywhere.
Underlying all other features of Whig ^trategy was the
message of compromise. In order to realize their dreams for
America, the Whigs strove against the mounting forces of
disunion. As the debate over states' rights and slavery made
the politics of the nation more divisive, Whig leaders in
both North and South stressed national interests over
sectional concerns. Alexander H. H. Stuart's speech during
debate on the Tariff of 1842 reflected this message.
Speaking of the need for a cooperative national outlook,
Stuart declared:
In my opinon ... there is in truth no necessary 
conflict of interest between the North and the South, or
17
the East and the West ... We should look at the great 
interests of the nation, not as something separate and 
distinct from each other, but as constituting parts of a 
grand system, intimately connected together, wisely 
fitted to each other, and when properly brought into 
action, working harmoniously together, and mutually 
giving and receiving nutriment and support.
13
The close of the Twenty-Seventh Congress in 1842 saw the
end of Stuart’s rather brief congressional career. Financial
necessity had, once again, forced him to return to the
practice of law. He continued thus until a September night
in 1850. A messenger arriving at midnight brought a letter
bearing the signature of Secretary of State Daniel Webster,
inviting Stuart to become secretary of the interior in the
administration of Millard Fillmore. Although he had not held
public office for nearly eight years, Stuart readily accepted
the invitation. The next two years were busy ones for him,
as he worked to organize what was then the newest cabinet-
14
level department in the federal government.
Stuart’s tenure as interior secretary ended after 
Winfield Scott, the Whig chosen instead of Fillmore as the 
party’s presidential candidate, lost to Democrat Franklin 
Pierce in the 1852 election. This defeat was one of several 
setbacks for Whiggery that characterized the decline of the 
national two-party system as it had existed for nearly twenty 
years. During the 1850s, the traditional Whig-Democrat 
framework and its national orientation shifted to a more 
geographical emphasis, pitting North against South on the
18
question of the extension, and ultimately the existence, of 
slavery.
The two parties did possess considerable power and
endurance. A "partisan imperative," in Joel Silbey's words,
"grew in the consciousness of most Americans to shape and
15
direct their politics." Sectional issues developed
alongside, and often subordinate to, national issues. Yet
Silbey also acknowledges that in the two-year period between
1854 and 1856, "one of the sharpest turnovers in American
politics occurred, resulting in the disappearance of the
national Whig party, the ultimate weakening and decline of
the Democratic party, and the creation and rise to dominance
16
of a sectionally focused Republican coalition."
Parties were indeed important features of the political
landscape in mid-nineteenth century America. They were
vehicles for expressions not only of civic opinion, but of
social and cultural imperatives as well. The considerable
patronage power of an incumbent party also served as an
incentive for their preservation. Michael F. Holt sees the
real value of the party system as being its ability to
diffuse disruptive political tensions. Rejecting the
argument that growing conflicts overwhelmed the Whig-
Democratic structure, Holt sees this structure as dependent
upon conflict to function effectively:
In the end what made the two-party system operate was 
its ability to allow political competition on a broad 
range of issues that varied from time to time and place
19
to place. If the genius of the American political 
system has been the peaceful resolution of conflict, 
what has supported two-party systems has been the 
conflict itself, not the resolution.
17
What happened to this two-party system? Past schools of
historical thought, as well as contemporary opinion, pointed
to the failure of the political process to contain the
conflict that led to war as evidence of the superficiality of
the parties. Reliance on parties was generally disparaged by
leaders across the country, especially in the South. Some
historians seemed to take their cue from this attitude,
characterizing parties as groupings of sectional, rather than
national, interests, and declaring the party framework to be
"artificial." Yet as Silbey notes, the people who denounced
"party hacks" never offered explanations as to why party
loyalties were so strong, nor really examined why the system
18
functioned so well for so long.
Holt’s explanation for the demise of the old parties 
suggests that the Whigs and Democrats suffered more from the 
homology of their philosophies than from political combat 
fatigue. Since the foundation of their success was the 
conflict between them, once they evolved similar stands on 
the issues their legitimacy was undermined. Or, as Holt 
states, "What destroyed the Second Party System was 
consensus, not conflict. The growing congruence between the 
parties on almost all issues by the early 1850s dulled the
20
sense of party difference and thereby eroded voters' loyalty
19
to the old parties.
Despite Holt's intriguing examination of the 
metamorphosis of the political process, the disintegration of 
the Whigs can be attributed in large part to the 
schizophrenic nature of the party. It was their inability to 
articulate a unified strategy of opposition to the Democracy 
which led to their dissolution. In the North, party policy 
was governed by devotion to Clay's American system, and by a 
desire for order in society and a belief in the need for 
reform. To northern Whigs, the institution of slavery 
threatened that harmonious vision, by abridging the rights of 
basic human dignity and freedom. Their colleagues in the 
South also embraced the American system, but ultimately broke 
with the northern wing over the issue of slavery. For 
southern Whigs, preservation of slavery as an economic and 
social system was vital to the maintenance of the same order 
that northerners desired. It was this conflict that 
destroyed Whiggery.
The demise of the Whig organization left Alexander H. H. 
Stuart a man without a party. In order to play an active 
role in politics, he, like many of his colleagues, needed to 
find a new vehicle for philosphical expression. His decision 
brought him into association with one of the most 
controversial movements in American political history. He 
chose the Know-Nothings.
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CHAPTER II
STUART AND THE KNOW-NOTHINGS: THE "MADISON” LETTERS
Slavery was not the only issue occupying the political
stage during the 1850s. Several historians have identified
ethnocultural factors as important elements of the national,
1
regional, and local debates of this period. In
particular, nativism and conflicts between certain religious
groups contributed to the nationwide discord. The rapid
growth of the Know-Nothing party, and later the Republicans,
are both in large part attributed to the importance of these
issues to many Americans at a time when immigration was at an
all-time high. The significant increase in the foreign-born
population, and the concomitant rise in ethnic and religious
confrontations between "foreigners" and "native Americans,"
provided a timely political and social focus that often
2
overshadowed the sectional conflict over slavery.
The Know-Nothing party enjoyed a brief, meteoric
career below Mason’s and Dixon’s line similar to that of the
party nationally. W. Darrell Overdyke’s The Know-Nothing
Party in the South traces this career in its several forms.
Nativism was a fundamental element of the faction's origin,
but increasingly the party became a focal point for
expressions of Union sympathy in the South:
One explanation of the appeal of Know-Nothingism to 
Southerners was undoubtedly ... [a] desire to find a way 
out of the increasing sectional difficulties and
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animosities. It was in a sense an ideal solution to be 
able to berate, to let off steam and resentment on, non- 
Americans rather than fellow citizens. Many 
conservative Southerners gladly availed themselves of 
the opportunity to attempt to avoid the long-debated and 
touchy issues of slavery and state rights.
3
The Know-Nothings’ southern successes were something of
a paradox. With a philosophy ostensibly founded on the basis
of the foreign threat, Know-Nothingism should have had little
relevancy in a region where only a small percentage of the
population was not native. Overdyke shows that "of the
fourteen states encompassed in ... [his] study as ’Southern,’
only five states, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri,
and Texas" had significant, and potentially troublesome,
numbers of foreign-born residents. In these states, and in
others like Virginia, which had very few immigrants or
Catholics in the 1850s, nativist sentiment was focused more
sharply on German and Irish radical groups, and the "threat"
4
they constituted to republican government.
Another attraction of the American party was its
newness. One of the organization's main tactics was to
present itself as being "antiparty." "South and North,
hundreds of thousands embraced Know-Nothingism as a vehicle
of reform because of its clearly expressed purpose to destroy
both old parties, drive hack politicians from office, and
5
return political power directly to the people." So writes 
Michael Holt, in assessing the party's quick acceptance 
throughout the country. Conversely, he points out that "the
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early triumphs and growing membership of the order attracted
to it, in the words of an indignant member, 'a set of selfish
politicians who cared not a straw about its principles [but]
were trying to use the order for promotion of their heartless
6
and sordid aims.'"
In Virginia, where the "Black Republican" party was
virtually non-existent, the struggle for political supremacy
was left to the Know-Nothings and the Democracy. Forming the
core of American party leadership were members of the defunct
Whig party. In more than twenty years as an active political
force in the Old Dominion, the Whigs had never carried the
state in a presidential election, despite coming very close
in 1840 and again in 1848 (ironically, the only years in
7
which the Whigs won the White House). In the vituperative
gubernatorial race of 1855, Democrat Henry A. Wise waged a
strident and ultimately successful campaign against the Know-
Nothing candidate, Thomas S. Flournoy. Taking on Wise's
formidable verbal arsenal would have been difficult enough
for even the most energetic of candidates. Flournoy,
however, did little campaigning and lost the election by some 
8
10,000 votes.
Alexander H. H. Stuart was one of the American party's 
most prominent organizers during this formative period. 
Stuart's "conversion" to the party may be seen as the natural 
consequence of his devotion to the principles that had
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governed his career as a Whig. Being a life-long member of
the party that had championed internal improvements, business
interests, and the preservation of the Union, he saw in the
American party a hope of continuing his advocacy of these
causes, as did many of his politically adrift colleagues. He
also saw the party as the best hope of achieving a sectional
compromise that would avert separation and war.
Stuart's decision to join the Know-Nothings was
influenced by a letter he received from Millard Fillmore in
January of 1855. The former Whig president offered his view
that the order presented "the only hope of forming a truly
national party, which shall ignore this constant and
distracting agitation of slavery; and take away the
inducement for demagogues of both parties, to pander to the
foreign vote and corruptly chaffer for its purchase at every
election." He advised Stuart to join the group, pointing out
the if it was to be effective, "every man who approves of its
main objectives should unite with them, and lend his
influence to give it a proper direction." Despite concerns
over the Know-Nothings' policy of secrecy, he advised Stuart
9
to join the organization.
Stuart took the advice. In describing Fillmore's later 
entry into the Know-Nothing ranks, the Virginian expressed 
some of the sentiments that guided his own actions:
[Fillmore's] opposition to the Democracy was a matter 
of principle, not of expediency ... He could not 
therefore ... eat his own words, retract his own
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charges, and falsify his own life, by affiliating with a 
party which he had contended to be unworthy of trust ... 
Knowing that the only available power to stay the 
torrent which threatened to overwhelm the country was 
the American party [he] sought to aid it in the 
fulfillment of its great mission of Peace.
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Stuart’s personal influence within the party in Virginia 
was such that when Governor Wise wrote an inflamatory letter 
in the Richmond Enquirer attacking the Know-Nothings, they 
readily turned to the gentleman from Staunton to write their 
reply. The result was a series of letters that appeared in 
the Richmond Whig in March and April of 1856, which Stuart 
wrote using the pseudonym "Madison.” In them, Stuart not 
only presented his party's stand on the issues of the day, 
but also went on the offensive against Henry A. Wise himself 
and the Democracy, both of whom he accused of hypocrisy, 
self-interest, and fraud.
What did Wise say in his letter to the Enquirer of March 
10, 1856 that so enraged and inspired the Know-Nothings? He 
began by replying to a comment allegedly made by Stuart at 
the Philadelphia American party convention, in which Stuart 
claimed to have once heard the governor describe Fillmore's 
administration as "Washington-like throughout." Wise denied 
the statement, as well as another attributed to Stuart 
suggesting that he had only won his office through the aid of 
defecting Whigs. He acknowledged that there may indeed have 
been some "truly conservative, conscientious, and 
constitution-loving" members of that party who had supported
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his candidacy. He blasted what he called the "renegade
Democrats who sneaked away from their former friends, and
took a test oath, in the secrecy of the culvert, by the light
of a dark lantern" (an obvious reference to the ritualistic
practices that had surrounded so many of the Know-Nothings'
activities, and which made such excellent targets for the
11
Democrats1 salvos).
Having dispensed with old matters, Wise then turned to 
the main concern of his letter— his view of what the parties 
in the national election stood for:
In the next Presidential canvass there will be new 
issues presented by three parties: the white man's 
party--the Democratic; the black man's party— the 
Black Republicans; the mulatto party— the cross of 
Northern and Southern Know-Nothings... All nature 
abhors vacuums and mongrels; and so do conscientious, 
conservative, and constitution-loving Whigs of 
Virginia. They can put up better with pure 
Africans— wool, flat nose, odor, ebon-skin and 
gizzard, foot and all— better than they can bear that 
cross of the Caucasian and the Cuffey which you call 
a— mulatto!
12
Wise's comments were consistent with the Democrats'
usual portrayal of the Republicans as abolitionists and the
Know-Nothings as "simultaneously illiberal and anti- 
13
slavery." Besides assailing the American party's stands on 
foreigners and Catholics, the Democracy in Virginia focused 
particularly on the slavery question, knowing that sort of 
rhetoric had greater emotional impact than any other. Wise's 
colorful use of metaphor and invective, and the sheer
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contempt with which he employed them against the Know-
Nothings, has led his most recent biographer to call his
letter "one of the most vulgar and demagogic ... to appear in
14
print during the 18501s."
The Whig lost no time in counterattacking. On March 11, 
an editorial condemned the language of "our dirt-loving 
governor," taking literally his use of the term "mulatto" to 
describe the Know-Nothings. The editors also proved that 
they were no strangers to hyperbole themselves:
A man who could calmly apply such villainous 
epithets to one half of the people of Virginia is 
already worse and more to be despised than the most 
graceless scamp of a negro in the State, and deserves
not the respect of a dog.
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The Enguirer fired back on the 14th, wondering what all 
the "fuss" was about. The paper condescendingly explained to 
the Whig that the governor had not actually called the Know-
Nothings mulattoes, but was merely using the term to
illustrate the difference in the issues between the various 
parties (one must assume that the editors of the Whig knew 
this to be the case, but decided to exploit Wise’s 
provocative language to the fullest). The people of 
Virginia, according to the Enguirer1s interpretation of 
Wise1s comments, "would put up with the pure black 
republican, with all his hideous deformities, rather than 
with this admixture, which in his estimation is nothing but
30
Northern Abolitionism, Infidelity, [and] Socialism...united
16
with Southern Know-Nothingism [and] Religious Intolerance."
Thus was the stage set for Alexander H.H. Stuart's most
memorable contribution to the print war between the American
party and the Democracy. On March 25, 1856, the first of his
"Madison" letters appeared in the Whig, under the heading,
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"Principles of the American Party." Stuart began by 
quoting Wise's letter, but declined to comment on either the 
propriety or the meaning of the governor's language. He 
suggested that Wise's antagonism toward the American party 
was a reaction to its mysterious image and to the passions 
aroused during the campaign of the previous year. With a 
poor performance by Flournoy, the Know-Nothings had had no 
strong advocate in the election. Thus Wise had been free to 
portray them as "just what his heated imagination supposed 
[them] to be." It was these "distempered views" of the 
American party that caused Wise to see it as something evil 
and reprehensible--"some dreadful monster, threatening the 
peace and welfare of the country."
However, the period of mysticism in the American party's 
history was over, according to Stuart. The party had "cast 
aside the veil of secrecy, and all its cumbrous mummery," and 
would henceforth operate as "an open organization,— in the 
full light of day." "Madison" implored his readers to give 
his party a fair hearing:
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All it [the American party] asks is to be tried by 
its principles, and the measures which it proposes as 
the legitimate result of those principles. It asks 
Virginians to look at them fairly and dispassion­
ately, and to say whether they are not the principles 
best calculated to arrest the tide of radicalism, and 
socialism, and black republicanism, which have for 
years been sweeping over this land. If they be not 
such, then I ask no support for them.
Letter Number Two dealt with the "measures and policy" 
of the American party, by presenting the platform adopted by 
the organization's National Council. The fundamental aims 
thus expressed were perpetuation of the federal union and 
curtailment of the increasing influence of foreign-born 
citizens and new immigrants on the American political 
process. Additionally, the platform featured planks which 
advocated curbs on congressional power over the states, the 
maintenance of honesty in government, and "strict economy in 
public expenditures." The separation of church and state was 
reaffirmed, along with the prohibition of "test oaths" for 
public offices. As for measures, the platform called for 
exclusion of all but native-born Americans from public 
positions, a naturalization residency requirement of twenty- 
one years, the denial of immigration rights to paupers and 
criminals, and elimination of non-citizens from the process 
of making states out of territories.
Stuart went on to provide evidence of the failure of 
national leaders since the earliest days of the republic to 
deny to criminals the right of entry into the country, and
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charged that there were numerous cases in many states of 
aliens being allowed to vote without being citizens. The 
evidence consisted of extensive quotations from the writings 
of Washington, Jefferson, Adams, and other early national 
leaders, as well as public speeches and records of 
legislative debates.
In Letters Three and Four Stuart examined the history of 
immigration in the United States. He commented on the early 
"mistake" of encouraging immigration, using Citizen Genet as 
an example of how unsuccessful that effort was. Stuart notes 
particularly the attempts through the years by leaders of 
various parties to enact stricter naturalization laws. Again 
quoting the Founding Fathers at length, he reinforced the 
theme that the American party*s advocacy of controls on 
foreigners was validated by the words and deeds of great men 
of the past.
In Letter Number Five, Stuart addressed three questions 
intended to justify the Know-Nothings' call for preference of 
Americans in public office as opposed to "foreigners." 
Question one: Was there anything wrong with such a stand? In 
Stuart's opinion, the answer was no. He bitterly assailed 
Wise and the Democrats for calling this proscription, when, 
in Stuart's words, they had denied "to 73,000 voters, 
representing near half a million Virginians, a single member 
of Congress, in violation of the Constitution and of the 
oaths of the legislators who had gerrymandered the
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districts." This reference to Wise’s leading role in the
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1850, and the
Democracy's success in maintaining the maldistribution of
political representation in favor of the eastern portion of
the state, underscores the intensity of local issues in the
national campaign. It also served to indict Wise on the same
charges of intolerance and opposition to civil freedoms that
18
he had leveled against the American party.
Stuart continued his drive to demonstrate how similar 
the Democrats' stands on naturalization were to those of the 
Know-Nothings. In his second question he asked: Was a
preference for native-born citizens over foreigners a 
violation of the spirit or letter of the Constitution? Once 
again, Stuart said no. No foreigner had the right to become 
a citizen unless that right was conferred by law. If such a 
right did exist, so his logic ran, then any residency 
requirement would be unfair. Since the Democrats were 
unwilling to abolish all such requirements, they were 
"guilty" of the same "crime" they accused the American party 
of committing. "Thus it is clear that upon this point...Mr. 
Wise and his party do not differ in principle from the 
American party. The question is not as to the propriety of a 
probation, but as to the length of that probation."
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Stuart dealt with the last of his rhetorical questions 
in Letter Number Six: What was the opinion of the Founding
Fathers on the subject of alien restrictions and residency 
requirements? As he had done in earlier letters, Stuart 
devoted considerable space to quotes from the republic's 
first generation of leaders on these issues, and included 
examples of past Democratic editorial and political 
expressions of anti-foreign rhetoric; specifically, comments 
of William Cullen Bryant and James Buchanan which showed, 
said Stuart, "that the Democracy have not always been such 
devoted friends of foreigners as they now profess to be."
On the same day that the Whig published "Madison" Letter
Number Six, the Enguirer, under the heading "A Rare Instance
of Disinterested Patriotism," offered its first editorial
commentary on the series. The paper asserted that "It is no
secret that Mr. A. H. H. Stuart is author of the unread and
unreadable articles in the Whig, in support of Know-
Nothingism generally and Fillmore in particular." The
Enguirer characterized Stuart's letters as "dull, decorous,
and interminable stuff," and sarcastically applauded the
former interior secretary's efforts at "establishing
Fillmore's title to the inheritance of Presidential
patronage!" The inference was clear— Stuart's desire for a
position in a Know-Nothing administration under Fillmore was
19
the main motive for his "Madison" letters.
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Disregarding the Enquirer1s accusations that he was 
writing for self-serving motives, Stuart forged ahead with 
Letters Seven and Eight, in which he discussed statistics on 
immigration into the United States, and the relationship 
between the foreign population in the country and incidences 
of crime and pauperism. He also identified and attacked 
certain Free German newspapers that Stuart charged called for 
radical, "non-Christian" changes in American society.
Letters Nine and Ten were devoted to the American 
party's stance on Catholicism. Stuart insisted that the 
party was not hostile to the sect as a whole, but rather to 
what he called the "Ultramontane" branch, which asserted the 
infallibility of the Pope in temporal as well as spiritual 
matters (as opposed to the "Gallican" branch, which 
recognized only spritual infallibility). Stuart 
characterized the principal struggle as being between the 
American party and the "Ultramontanes" who published 
influential journals calling on the growing numbers of 
Catholic immigrants to seize greater political power. Stuart 
quoted these journals extensively, and reaffirmed the right 
of the American party to oppose what it saw as Catholic-led 
attempts to usurp political power from native Americans.
Letters Eleven and Twelve, the last in the series, 
specifically addressed Wise's comments on the American party 
as the "mulatto" party, and on how the Democrats constituted 
the "white man's party." Number eleven is a spirited defense
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of the Fillmore administration, and of the choice of many 
Whigs to become Know-Nothings. Number twelve is rather 
strange, as Stuart attempted to show that the Democrats were 
so incompetent politically that they had to recruit "old 
Whigs" to run their party. Stuart seems to be running 
counter to the rest of what he has written about the ties of 
Whigs to the American party, implying that many talented and 
politically astute Whigs found more comfort in the Democracy 
than with the Know-Nothings. While this was certainly true 
in many cases, it seems odd that Stuart would call attention 
to the fact when his supposed purpose is to defend the choice 
of Whigs to join the American party.
The Enquirer thought it was strange too. The paper
confessed to being puzzled by Stuart's statements, wondering
why he would risk alienating members of his own party to
demonstrate "that the best and brightest ornaments of the
Whig party now shine conspicuously in the ranks of the
Democracy." What, the Enquirer asked, was Stuart's reason
for writing something so damaging to the American party "that
the world should and does think that the party is altogether
20
unworthy of their confidence and association[?3"
On this note the "Madison" letters came to an end. In 
them, Alexander H.H. Stuart formulated the most comprehensive 
explanation and defense of the American party to be found in 
the columns of the Richmond newspapers of 1856. Stuart's 
letters set out to accomplish several goals: a) To respond to
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Governor Wise's attacks in the Enquirer, and to discredit his 
accusations; b) To espouse the principles and purpose of the 
Know-Nothings, combatting the negative connotation that 
burdened their party; c) To convince the people of Virginia 
that the American party deserved their trust and support more 
than the Democracy, which Stuart characterized as leading the 
nation down the path of disunion. How successfully did Stuart 
convey these messages?
The indomitable Henry A. Wise did not suffer any
longstanding loss of prestige among the majority of
Virginians. Indeed, the governor advised one supporter to
disregard the "cowardly, vulgar, drunken wretches" who
opposed him. He gave no quarter in his battle with the Know-
21
Nothings of Virginia, and sought none from them. It is 
thus doubtful that Stuart's condemnation of Wise did any 
significant damage to the governor politically or personally.
In attempting to define and defend the American party 
platform of 1856, Stuart enjoyed somewhat greater success.
His writings as "Madison" constitute some of the most cogent 
arguments in favor of the Know-Nothings' policies ever 
written. Stuart was particularly adept at focusing his 
remarks on the American party's value as the preserver of 
peace in the nation. His thoughtful and detailed 
examinations of the similarities and differences between his
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party and the Democrats provided readers with compelling
arguments in favor of Know-Nothingism.
However, the true importance of Stuart's "Madison"
letters lies in what he did not say. Stuart did not try to
repudiate any of the anti-slavery attitudes of northern Know-
Nothings, something that damaged the party in the South.
This was a serious omission, especially given Wise's
rhetorical accusations that southern Know-Nothings were
really abolitionists. Also, Stuart's exhortations against
foreigners and Catholics, while reflecting mainstream
American party doctrine, had little relevance in a state
which had "less than eight thousand Catholic citizens and a
ratio of one foreign-born to thirty-eight native born 
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inhabitants."
Finally, Stuart's success in winning over voters in the
Commonwealth to Know-Nothingism is difficult to assess.
There is no way of knowing how many Virginians were convinced
by his arguments, but the results of the November election
proved that the Democracy was in the ascendancy, while the
Know-Nothings' strength was waning. More than 150,000
Virginians went to the polls, casting 90,083 votes for
Buchanan and 60,150 for Fillmore. This was an even greater
margin of victory than that won by Wise in the gubernatorial
election of the year before, when he received 83,424 votes to
Flournoy's 73,244. There were no Republican votes recorded
23
in either contest.
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The failure of Know-Nothingism in Virginia reflected the
demise of the order nationally. The election of Democrat
James Buchanan to the presidency in 1856 sounded the death
knell for the American party. The "stigma of abolitionism"
did the southern Know-Nothings no good in a period when
tensions over slavery were mounting. This, and the advocacy
of immigration reform by the Democracy, undermined Know-
Nothing strength. In addition to the pressure from southern
Democrats, northern Republicans under able leadership made
spirited nativist appeals for Know-Nothings to join their
ranks. Essentially like the Whigs before it, the American
party disintegrated into the vortex of sectional controversy,
denied a viable national stage upon which to present its 
24
platform.
Alexander H. H. Stuart and his colleagues attempted 
to rally Virginians around the standard of their party, but 
to no avail. Millard Fillmore's belief that Know-Nothingism 
would enable the country to "ignore" the issue of slavery was 
proved to be in vain. As the sectional crisis intensified 
during the last years of the decade, Stuart once again found 
himself bereft of a party through which to express his views. 
Time was running out for him and for the Union.
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CHAPTER III 
SECESSION AND WAR
From the time he left the Fillmore cabinet in 1853, 
Stuart was urged to run again for a seat in the General 
Assembly. Although he repeatedly declined to seek office, 
the idea was never far from his thoughts. It was therefore 
not surprising that he allowed himself to be nominated as a 
candidate for the Virginia Senate from Augusta County in 
1857. He ran ostensibly as a Know-Nothing, despite the fact 
that the party, as noted in the preceding chapter, had 
been virtually eliminated as an effective political force. 
However, Stuart’s popularity among the old Whigs of Augusta
assured his victory, and he remained in the Senate until
1
1861.
During this period national attention became more 
sharply focused on the issue of slavery. The violence along 
the border between Kansas and Missouri, spawned by the fierce 
debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act, in turn begat fervent 
beliefs and intense hatred in both the ’’free" and ’’slave" 
camps. Perhaps no individual was more moved to action than 
John Brown. Following his guerrilla warfare activity in 
"Bleeding Kansas," he and a loosely organized group of 
followers bent on arming slaves for a general revolt 
attempted to seize the United States arsenal at Harper's 
Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia) on October 15, 1859.
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After a brief siege in the town's fire station, marines under
the command of Colonel Robert E. Lee ended the stalemate by
capturing Brown and those of his band who were not killed in
the assault. Also taking part in the attack was Lieutenant
J. E. B. Stuart, the future Confederate cavalry commander,
2
who was Alexander H. H. Stuart's cousin.
The raid shocked and alarmed Virginians. Little time 
was lost in bringing Brown to trial, declaring his guilt, and 
executing him. Governor Wise reported the matter to the 
General Assembly when it convened its regular session in 
December. His message was referred to a joint committee of 
the House and Senate, of which Stuart was appointed chairman. 
By naming one of the state's most prominent Whigs to head this 
panel, the Democratic majority in the Assembly (particularly 
Southern Rights activists) hoped to use Stuart and some of 
his colleagues to their advantage. The appointment put him 
in a delicate position. Adopting too moderate a tone might 
have suggested that past accusations of abolitionist 
sympathies (such as those made by Wise in the 1856 campaign) 
were not wholly without foundation. On the other hand, a 
strident, fire-eating stance would only serve to further 
exacerbate the tensions which threatened the Union, something 
Stuart had spent most of his political life trying to avoid.
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The committee reported its findings to the legislature
on January 26, 1860. It summarized the events leading up to
Brown1s attack, declaring "that many others besides the
parties directly engaged in the raid at Harper*s Ferry" had
aided and abetted the effort. These were primarily northern
abolitionists, who had encouraged and financed Brown's
schemes, although their support proved insufficient to assure
the success of his mission. Stuart's committee condemned
their actions, asserting that "they must henceforth, in the
esteem of all good men, be branded as the guilty confederates
of thieves, murderers, and traitors." Additional commentary
on the evolution of slavery as a national issue sought to
demonstrate northern violations of provisions in the United
States Constitution for fugitive slave laws. References were
also made to the various personal liberty laws which had been
enacted in the northern states, and the hostility towards the
South as expressed from the pulpits of abolitionist
clergymen. Yet the committee also asserted Virginia's
devotion to the Union, assuming what may fairly be called a
3
tone of righteous indignation over the incident.
The committee made three main recommendations, which 
Henry T. Shanks discusses at length in The Secession Movement 
in Virginia, 1847-1861. A call for strengthening of the 
militia was met with enthusiasm, given the fears of 
widespread rebellion which followed Brown's raid. The 
report also advocated "encouraging the domestic manufactures
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of our own State, promoting direct trade with foreign
countries, and establishing, as far as may be practicable,
our commercial independence." Shanks likens these economic
moves to those of the American colonists against Great
Britain before the Revolution, in that their goal was both
to hurt the North financially and to give the South a greater
4
degree of political, and perhaps military, self-sufficiency.
Alexander H. H. Stuart must have noted with grim irony 
that his committee's recommendations, which echoed the pro­
industrial message voiced by the Whigs for years, finally found 
support in 1860, only as a means to put further distance 
between North and South. As the Presidential election 
campaign progressed, he observed that that gap was widening, 
and sought to construct a political coalition that would 
preserve the Union and peace. He had expressed his 
sentiments the previous year, during the Virginia 
gubernatorial campaign. In a letter which was circulated as 
a handbill to the Convention of Whigs and Americans meeting 
in Richmond, Stuart exhorted his fellow Virginians to take 
the lead in preserving the Union:
This sectional strife has gone far enough. The time 
has arrived when it must be arrested. There is a 
peculiar propriety in Virginia's assuming the office of 
peace maker [sic]. Standing as she does, in the centre 
of the Confederacy, having common interests with both 
sections but identified with neither extreme, her 
counsels must be received with respect. Let, then, 
Virginia, the parent of States, and the great pioneer in 
the cause of liberty, let Virginia, the mother of 
Washington, with a thousand memories, more precious than
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rubies, encircling her brow, stand forth with majestic 
mien, and say to the angry waves of faction, "peace! be 
still."
5
It was vintage Whig doctrine, but it was not enough.
The candidate most favored by Stuart and his compatriots,
John Bell of Tennessee, failed to carry the eclectic
Constitutional Union party to victory in November, 1860.
Abraham Lincoln’s election brought the Republicans to power,
and caused the secession of seven southern states by the
first of February, 1861. During January, the General
Assembly voted to call a convention to discuss Virginia's
future actions in the crisis, without first submitting the
matter to the citizens of the Commonwealth in a referendum.
This violation of tradition particularly angered the western
parts of the state, and pro-union men such as Stuart (who was
fighting a delaying action in the Senate) decried the move as
likely to fan the flames of discord. Once the decision for a
convention was made, the voters did have a chance to decide
whether its actions would be submitted to them for approval.
On February 4, Virginians handed the Unionists a substantial
victory by endorsing the idea of "reference," or approval by
6
the electorate of any ordinances passed by the convention.
Even with this apparent popular support for moderation 
and preservation of the Union, Stuart and the Conservatives 
(as the opponents to secession were called) realized that any 
resolution of the crisis would have to be achieved in a way
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that preserved Virginia’s honor and did not threaten to pit 
the Commonwealth against her sister southern states. Shanks 
notes that the pro-Union sympathy expressed by the convention 
referendum was founded mainly on the condition that the North 
would compromise over slavery, and not attempt "coercion" of 
Virginia in the conflict. His conclusion is that "the state 
was still loyal to the Union, and in this election expressed 
her desire to preserve it, provided this could be done
7
without interfering with what she considered her interests."
The secession convention convened in Richmond on
February 13, 1861. Stuart was chosen as one of three
delegates from Augusta County. The other two were his law
partner and brother-in-law John B. Baldwin (who like Stuart
was a well-known former Whig) and George Baylor, who despite
a lack of prior political experience was chosen for his
enthusiastic support of the Union. All three of these men
were in fact staunch Unionists, as were many of their
colleagues from the Shenandoah Valley. Of the twenty
delegates to the convention from the mountain/valley region,
thirteen came as declared Union men. Positions changed
somewhat during the course of the proceedings, and many of
the Unionists later signed the final ordinance of secession
for the sake of solidarity. However, the choices of the
delegates from the western areas of the state clearly
reflected strong support at the outset for avoiding, if
8
possible, Virginia’s secession.
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Stuart was recognized as one of the leaders of the
Unionist faction within the convention membership, which
consisted of about fifty delegates. Roughly thirty delegates
were in the secessionist camp at the beginning. Filling out
the membership was a moderate group, initially leaning toward
the Unionists, whose numbers fluctuated considerably. As the
convention gradually learned of President Lincoln’s resolve
to hold Fort Sumter and compel the seceded states to submit
to federal authority, the moderates moved more into the
fire-eaters’ camp. Most of Stuart's Union group remained
firmly against secession to the last, though its numbers had
thinned somewhat by the time the final ordinance of secession
9
resolution was voted on.
Stuart1s most important role in the convention was as a 
member of a three-man commission sent to Washington, D.C. on 
April 8 to meet with Lincoln. Accompanying Stuart were 
William Ballard Preston of Montgomery County, an influential 
moderate, and George Wythe Randolph of Richmond, one of the 
secessionist leaders. Their mission was to determine if 
Lincoln planned to hold or evacuate Fort Sumter and Fort 
Pickens in Florida, and to establish whether any hope for 
compromise still existed. Torrential rains delayed their 
arrival in Washington until April 12, the day Sumter was 
fired upon. When the delegation called on the President the 
next day, he handed them a written statement which said, in
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effect, that he would stand by the policy enunciated in his
inaugural address— to use whatever means necessary to "hold,
occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the
Government." Realizing that they could do no more in
Washington, the delegation hastened back to Richmond, and
10
made their report to the convention on the fifteenth.
The next day, Preston offered an ordinance of secession,
and Stuart rose to speak against it. It was the longest and
most comprehensive address Stuart made during the convention,
and in it he sought to amplify the committee report of the
previous day while also issuing an eleventh-hour plea for
more time to consider the Commonwealth's course of action.
Lincoln's response to the delegation of which Stuart was a
part was, he agreed, unsatisfactory. He regarded it, "while
courteous in form, as almost hostile in intent." Stuart
related the statements he made to the President, in which he
attempted to show that Lincoln actually had no Constitutional
authority to take aggressive action against South Carolina
11
and the other seceding states.
Stuart expressed surprise at Lincoln's proclamation of 
April 15, which called for 75,000 volunteers from the loyal 
states, including Virginia, to put down the rebellion. He 
even went to the point of contacting Secretary of State 
William Seward to determine if the document was genuine.
By the time Seward replied in the affirmative, Stuart had 
learned enough about the proclamation to know that the news
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was true. It ended whatever hopes he had entertained for 
reconciliation. Among his other feelings, he noted with 
sadness how the current crisis was particularly painful in a 
very personal sense:
Seventy-nine years ago, the people of Augusta deputed 
my father to this city as a member of the Convention to 
ratify and adopt the Constitution which formed this 
Union. After a lapse of three-quarters of a century, 
the same County, the descendants of the same 
constituency, have deputed me here to uphold and sustain 
it. I have therefore, a traditional attachment to the 
Union. I will stand by it, Sir, as long as I can stand 
by it consistently with the honor and interests of 
Virginia. I must confess that my hopes in the 
perpetuation of the Union, as it now stands, have been 
greatly weakened, if they have not been entirely 
destroyed.
12
Although he felt Virginia could not be reconciled with 
the "Black Republican" administration in Washington, Stuart 
argued that immediate secession would be a grave mistake. He 
observed that whereas the "present seat of war" was confined 
to South Carolina, Virginia*s departure would make the 
Commonwealth a battleground in the future. The state was 
unprepared for war, both militarily and financially, and in 
his view would be "in the condition of a man whose arms are 
paralyzed." His greatest fear was that of internal conflict. 
The western portions of the state were tied to the economy of 
the Ohio Valley, and to "the non-slaveholding States of the 
Great West." Should war come, the western counties of 
Virginia "will be led, I fear, ultimately to conclude that
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their interest in the war is secondary to other interests
13
which they have connected to their material prosperity."
Rather than leave the Union at a moment he considered
disadvantageous, Stuart urged that Virginia consult with her
sister border states, and also northern states, in an effort
to amend the Constitution in such a way as to preserve the
peace. He even suggested approaching Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey with an offer
for forming a new national government:
I would invite them to join us under a new 
Constitution, framed with such guarantees as would give 
to us effectual security for all our rights. I would 
invite them to disconnect themselves from the extreme 
North and Northwest, and, unlike some of my friends, my 
information leads me to believe that such an appeal 
would be responded to by these States.
14
This last, desperate suggestion of Stuart’s demonstrates
both his fervent desire for avoidance of war and his tragic
misconception of the current crisis. The state of popular
opinion in Virginia, and certainly that of the convention,
doomed any attempt to forestall secession. On April 17,
1861, the ordinance of secession was adopted by a vote of
eighty-eight to fifty-five. The votes of Stuart, Baldwin,
and Baylor against the measure recorded Augusta as opposed
15
to the fateful decision.
Virginia’s decision to sever her ties with the United 
States was quickly followed by her acceptance into the 
Confederacy. As the Old Dominion prepared for war, and
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welcomed the Confederate government to its new capital in
Richmond, the Secession Convention performed one of its final
acts. On May 1, 1861, a seven-member committee was formed,
with Alexander H. H. Stuart as chairman, and charged with
framing amendments to the state constitution. The action was
motivated by a desire to consolidate more power within the
state bureaucracy. As Jack P. Maddex notes in The Virginia
Conservatives, 1867-1869; A Study of Reconstruction Politics:
"Since the convention consisted mainly of Whigs skeptical of
democracy and of Southern Rights Democrats disillusioned with
it, the time seemed right to undo some of the 1851
constitution’s democratic innovations." A group of
amendments designed to reduce the number of elective offices
and increase the appointive power of the General Assembly was
recommended, along with a separate proposal to restore the
taxpaying qualification for suffrage. In March, 1862, voters
rejected the amendments. Although they accepted the suffrage
restriction, it was conditional upon the ratification of the
16
amendments, and thus also failed.
Stuart held no public office in either the Virginia or 
Confederate governments during the Civil War. He was fifty- 
four years old in 1861, and had no prior military experience. 
His involvement in the war effort was limited to public 
speeches in support of relief efforts for soldiers in the 
field, and correspondence with state officials (including 
Governor John Letcher) about rumors of troop movements and
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the economic situation in the Valley. His son, Alexander H.
H. Stuart, Jr., who entered the Virginia Military Institute
in 1863, did enlist, and fought with the corps of cadets in
17
the battle of New Market on May 15, 1864.
The elder Stuart was given an unusual chance to serve in
the form of an offer to act as a secret agent of the
government in Canada. Stuart*s brother-in-law John Baldwin,
who had become a member of the Confederate House of
Representatives, wrote him on January 24, 1864, saying that
Confederate officials had asked him to determine if Stuart
"would consent to undertake a mission of a confidential and
most responsible and important character, involving the
control of large sums of money— and the intercourse with
parties requiring extreme caution and great tact." Stuart
apparently made no immediate reply. It was not until March
25, when he received an invitation from Secretary of State
Judah P. Benjamin to come to Richmond on "a matter of great
public interest," that he decided to ascertain the nature of
18
this mysterious offer.
Stuart met with Benjamin and President Jefferson Davis, 
and learned that he had been chosen as a "Commissioner of the 
Confederate States," with the mission of aiding what would 
today be called "fifth column" groups in the North, including 
the Knights of the Golden Circle. Stuart was to make his way 
to Canada via Nassau, where he would have a staff of
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operatives and sole authority over a London bank account
containing 3,000,000 pounds sterling. Stuart may have
misjudged the political situation during the secession
crisis, but by 1864 he saw things with greater sagacity. He
felt that Secretary Benjamin "was laboring under a remarkable
delusion as to the peace sentiment at the North, as well as
about the probable efficiency of such a Commission as he
19
proposed. I at once declined it."
Stuart’s instinct proved correct, for in little more
than a year the Confederate States of America was no more.
Virginia, like the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia
to whom Robert E. Lee addressed his farewell had, "after four
years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and
fortitude ... been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers
20
and resources." As the men returned home from Appomattox, 
the political future promised to be equally arduous for the 
Commonwealth, and for Alexander H. H. Stuart.
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CHAPTER IV
RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE RADICAL CHALLENGE
In the month following the surrender of Lee's army,
a state of confusion and fearful uncertainty prevailed in
Virginia. The Commonwealth was ravaged from the effects of
four years of war--farms and homes had been destroyed, the
economy wrecked, and many towns and cities, like Richmond,
bore scars from lengthy occupation by both Confederate and
Union forces. The capital city was especially in turmoil,
since the fires set by retreating Confederate forces had
blazed out of control, with tragic results. The news of
Lincoln's assassination inspired rumors of anarchy in
1
Washington and reprisals against southerners.
Alexander H. H. Stuart's hometown of Staunton also 
showed the debilitating effects of the war, although the city 
had been spared for much of the conflict. According to the 
former historian of the Stonewall Brigade Band, Marshall 
Moore Brice, the Staunton to which soldiers returned was "a 
desolated community." Railroad tracks were destroyed, 
telegraph lines lay on the ground where they had fallen when 
cut, and many stores remained closed, lacking both supplies 
and customers. Joseph A. Waddell, the editor of the Staunton 
Spectator, noted in his diary on April 20 that "We are now in 
a condition of anarchy. Bands of soldiers are roaming about 
and taking off all cattle, sheep, horses, etc., they suppose
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to be public property." The arrival of a small detatchment
of Union cavalry helped to restore order temporarily, but the
2
troops soon departed.
Everyone agreed that the situation was intolerable, and
that citizen action of some sort was warranted. Stuart and
"a half a dozen or more intelligent gentleman of Staunton"
met on May 1 to organize a mass meeting of the people of
Augusta County, to be held at the county courthouse on May 8.
His account of the May 1 meeting, given later for the
Virginia Historical Society, stressed the unstable conditions
in Augusta and the rest of Virginia, noting that:
[W]e had been reduced to the sad condition of a 
people without any government, State or Federal. The 
Confederate Government had practically ceased to exist. 
The State Government had been overthrown. The officers 
of both were refugees, and there was no reasonable 
prospect of the reestablishment of either. Every social 
bond had been ruptured. There were no officials who 
would be recognized as having authority to represent the 
people or to give expression to their opinions and 
wishes.
3
Stuart and John B. Baldwin, along with three other men,
journeyed to a secluded part of neighboring Rockbridge
County, where Virginia's Confederate governor-in-exile,
William "Extra Billy" Smith, was discovering that the people
of the region were not in favor of his plans for waging
4
guerrilla warfare against the Yankees. Smith received the 
delegation courteously, but asserted that the Augusta meeting 
would not only be improper but potentially "revolutionary," 
given the current unsettled conditions. He maintained that
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as the duly-elected governor of the Commonwealth, only he
could legally treat with federal authorities as a bona-fide
representative of her people. Stuart pointed out that under
normal conditions they would gladly defer to his executive
authority, but that in the present circumstances it was
unlikely that either the Union army or the government would
regard him as a legitimate official. According to Stuart,
"The demand for prompt and decided action by the people was
urgent. They could not afford to wait for the result of
tedious and probably ineffectual diplomatic negotiations, and
5
therefore ... must persist in holding the proposed meeting."
Handbills announcing a "Mass-Meeting of the People of 
Augusta" were printed and circulated among the populace, and 
on May 8 the courthouse was filled to capacity. Stuart was 
called to the chair, and proceeded to review the events of 
the preceding few weeks which formed the justification for 
the gathering. He then continued by declaring that with the 
failure of the Confederate "revolution," the people of 
Virginia were free to regain their rights as citizens of the 
United States, once they acknowledged the authority of the 
federal Constitution. This was correct because, according to 
Stuart*s logic, the question of treason applied only to 
individuals, and not to the Commonwealth:
A State in its political capacity cannot commit 
treason. A State as a political community cannot incur 
forfeitures. Treason can only be committed by
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individuals, and the penalties can be inflicted on 
individuals only.
I take it therefore, that Virginia still has rights 
under the Constitution of the United States, which have 
only been suspended during the abortive effort to sever 
her connection with the United States, and it seems to 
me to be our duty to try and have those rights 
recognized and respected.
6
This attitude, as Michael Perman observes in Reunion
Without Compromise; The South and Reconstruction, 1865-1868,
was one of submission that "was tactical rather than
heartfelt.*1 Many southerners, especially prewar Unionists
like Stuart, were ready to acknowledge the end of the
rebellion, but not the abrogation of their constitutional
rights. Perman identifies this stance as one of four
formulated to avoid harsh treatment of the South in the
aftermath of defeat. The others stressed the need to restore
the economic vitality of the region, the moral imperative of
northern magnanimity, and the danger that severe measures
"would alienate those who were cooperative and drive them
into the arms of the irreconcilables." The last statement
refers to those southerners who vowed to remain
"unreconstructed," resisting efforts at accommodation and 
7
compromise.
Following the May 8 meeting, another five-man committee 
(again with Stuart and Baldwin in charge) was formed, this 
time to meet with Francis H. Pierpont, the Governor of the 
Union-recognized "Restored Government of Virginia" that would
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install itself in Richmond later in the month. Shortly after
his arrival, Pierpont received the Augusta delegation in the
mansion recently vacated by "Extra Billy" Smith. Throughout
the cordial discussion, according to Stuart, the governor
"displayed an amicable and patriotic spirit, and closed the
interview by giving such assurances of sympathy and friendly
co-operation as were satisfactory to the committee." Stuart
also observed that his group encountered other delegations
representing counties from other parts the state, which had
taken their lead from the gathering in Augusta. This, he
felt, proved that the meeting had been "not only a bold but a
8
wise and judicious movement."
Stuart? s estimation of Pierpont * s intentions was 
essentially correct. Despite the fact that he was the leader 
of a state government which had never received the support of 
a majority of Virginians, Pierpont believed he could lead the 
Commonwealth back into the Union with a minimum of trouble. 
One of his biographers, Richard G. Lowe, feels that Pierpont 
"sincerely believed that the former Confederates had learned 
their lesson at Appomattox, that they would heed the counsels 
of the North, that they would repudiate their old leaders and 
deal fairly with the freedmen— and that they would do all 
these things of their own free will." He called for the 
reenfranchisement of former Confederates, and influenced the 
decision of the Restored General Assembly to call for a
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statewide general election to select a new legislature and
9
congressional delegation on October 12, 1865.
This election presented Stuart with the opportunity to 
end the self-imposed absence from public office which he had 
maintained during the war. He announced his candidacy for 
the House of Representatives to the voters of the Sixth 
Congressional District in the Staunton Spectator of September 
19, 1865 by declaring that he had been "inflexibly opposed" 
to secession. He pointed to his April 16, 1861 address to 
the secession convention, in which he urged delay and 
consideration of other options, as proof of his devotion to 
the Union. Stuart did not, however, disavow his eventual 
decision to sign the ordinance of secession for the sake of 
unity within the Commonwealth. Nor did he wish to disguise 
the fact that he had made speeches on behalf of soldiers in 
the field, urging contributions for their support. His 
sympathies, he maintained, "were with my own people." He 
admitted the mixed emotions with which he followed the 
progress of the conflict:
Though I believed Virginia to be in the wrong I could 
not do otherwise than rejoice when she rejoiced and 
mourn when she mourned. I was proud of Lee and Jackson 
and Johnston and my kinsman [J. E. B.] Stuart, and the 
host of other gallant Virginians who won immortal honor 
in an ill-advised and unnecessary contest.
10
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In a study of the 1865 Virginia congressional election, 
Alan B. Bromberg discusses the issues which characterized 
this important contest. He demonstrates that all of the 
candidates felt support for President Andrew Johnson’s 
reconstruction policies would be the best defense against the 
growing threat of harsh treatment at the hands of the Radical 
Republicans in Congress. All were also agreed that the 
freedmen, while entitled to humane treatment, should not be 
given the vote under any circumstances. There was even a 
general consensus that colonization would probably be
11
necessary to resolve the problem of black-white relations.
The one issue that came to dominate the campaign
debates, both on the stump and in the newspapers, was that of
the "ironclad oath" which Congress had initiated in 1862 for
all United States government officials as an affirmation of
loyalty. Newspapers and community leaders across the state
urged that only candidates who qualified to take the oath
should run for office or be elected, as further proof of the
desire of Virginians for better relations with the North.
There were several exceptions to this sentiment, including
the editorial voice of the Staunton Spectator, and Candidate
Alexander H. H. Stuart. The Spectator decried the oath as
unconstitutional. Stuart did the same, as Bromberg notes, by
"citing the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, James
Madison, and Chancellor Kent of New York" in his address to
12
the sixth district voters.
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A spirited campaign ensued in the Sixth, as both Stuart
and his opponent, Republican John F. Lewis, accused each
other of being unqualified to run because of the test oath
requirement--Stuart because he had signed the ordinance of
secession and made speeches for the war effort, and Lewis
(who was also a delegate to the secession convention but
refused to support the ordinance) because he had supplied
13
iron ore to the Confederate government. It is interesting
to note that Stuart made this charge against Lewis, who
supported the oath, even though he himself regarded it as
unconstitutional. Stuart won the election easily,
capitalizing on his distinguished record and the strong
14
support of the old Whig bastion of Augusta.
Less than three weeks before the election, Stuart had 
written to James Lawson Kemper, the former Confederate 
general and future governor of Virginia, expressing his 
attitude on what lay ahead for himself and for Virginia.
"Old party divisions belong to the 'dead past,1 & I will be 
among the last to exhume them. We must all, now, live for 
the present & the future, & dedicate our best efforts to 
'raise up our bleeding country from the dust & set her 
free.'" Stuart was doubtless sincere in his desire to 
improve the Commonwealth's condition, but his later actions 
suggest that he did not truly consider prewar party 
affiliations to be irrelevant to the present. His political
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philosophy was still that of a Whig; the war, if anything, 
had only served to vindicate his judgement and that of his 
colleagues in the correctness of their cause. He appreciated 
the odds that he and his fellow Virginia congressmen would be 
denied their seats when they went to Washington. He was 
however, determined to assert his right to be there in 
opposition to Radical Republican actions, just as he had 
antagonized secessionist Democrats (like his old opponent
15
Henry A. Wise) by running for the seat in the first place.
When Congress convened in December, the ascendency of 
the Radicals was demonstrated when they refused to seat the 
Virginia senators and representatives. In his narrative 
which traced the origins and work of the Committee of Nine 
(discussed in the next chapter), Stuart left no doubt as to 
his feelings on the propriety of these actions:
By what authority this outrage on the constitutional 
rights of the Southern members was perpetuated I do not 
know. We were not permitted to be heard in defense of 
our rights, and by this lawless device we were quietly 
evicted from our seats! That this was a gross 
usurpation of power, not warranted by the Constitution, 
was at a later day substantially admitted by leading 
members of Congress, when they acknowledged that they 
had been acting outside the limits of the Constitution! 
[Stuart's italics]
16
Stuart knew well by what authority the "outrage" had 
been committed. In private, he was even more vehement in his 
condemnation of the Radicals:
After the close of the War, I was elected, almost by 
acclamation, to Congress. I went to Washington, with 
eight colleagues, all of whom, like myself, had been
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Union men. But the radical congress, with a stupidity 
equalled only by their reckless disregard for the 
Constitution, refused to admit us to our seats!
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The same October, 1865 election that handed Stuart his
hollow congressional victory also selected a new General
Assembly, which, like Congress, began its sessions in
December of that year. Stuart's brother-in-law Baldwin was
chosen as Speaker of the House of Delegates, and because of
his strong leadership the Assembly became known as the
"Baldwin legislature." Like many of the congressmen, the
senators and delegates sent to Richmond by the voters were
conservative in their political outlook. Most were known to
have been against secession, though some (including Speaker
Baldwin) had served in the Confederate government.
Significantly, the vast majority of the members of both
houses had, at one time or another, belonged to the Whig 
18
party.
The Baldwin legislature met only twice before Virginia 
was reorganized under military occupation in 1867. During 
that time it passed measures which demonstrated a backward- 
looking point of view in terms of the issues facing Virginia. 
The lawmakers modified the state code to remove much of the 
discrimination against blacks, but steadfastly avoided 
according the freedmen any political rights. Acts of the 
former Restored Government agreeing to the creation of West 
Virginia were invalidated, and Congress was asked to repeal
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the federal test oath. In a move that set the stage for
political controversy in Virginia for the next generation,
the Baldwinites voted to fully fund the state’s prewar and
Confederate debt. Attempts were made to remake postwar
Virginia into the image of the old Whig platforms of the
past. These moves, writes Jack P. Maddex, Jr., were too
little, too late. "Virginia would have to move not only in
the direction of the old Whig program, but far beyond it,
either to satisfy the Northern Congress or to adjust to
19
postwar social conditions."
The supreme example of the Baldwin legislature's 
failure to accurately gauge northern sentiment came when it 
refused to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and thus affirmed Virginia's opposition 
to black suffrage. The legislators echoed the editorial 
opinion of the Richmond Examiner of December 28, 1866, which 
declared:
As to the alternative of negro suffrage, we answer, 
that we know the black man, and his utter unfitness for 
any such part in the government of our country. His 
race has been, for countless ages, the subject of 
slavery in its grossest forms, which have dwarfed his 
intellect and imbruted him, morally and physically, to a 
degree that makes his identity a problem not to be 
solved in our day. What he may be capable in the remote 
future, we do not pretend to say ... but, as he now 
presents himself, we know that there is no creature in 
human form less capable of self-government.
20
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This attitude did not promise to sit well with the 
Radicals, whose power to determine federal Reconstruction 
policy was nearing its zenith. Initially, Stuart was 
confident that moderate elements in the North would be able 
to temper Radical zeal. A portion of his address to the 
Literary Societies of the University of Virginia on June 29, 
1866 reveal his optimism:
Let us not despond. True, clouds and darkness 
envelop the eastern horizon, but I think I see a broad 
belt of golden sky in the west, which gives assurance of 
a brighter morrow.
The people of the North profess to have fought to 
preserve [the] bonds of the Union intact, and it can 
hardly be supposed that ... they will now permit this 
object to be defeated, and these ligaments to be severed 
by the machinations of selfish and insidious demagogues. 
The Union will be restored, and restored on the basis of 
the wise policy of the President. The extreme measures 
of the Radicals will be repudiated by the good sense of 
the people, and meet the fate of their predecessors, the 
alien and sedition laws.
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Stuart shared similar views with John Janney, the 
Loudoun County lawyer who chaired the Virginia secession 
convention. Declaring that the best policy was to "do 
nothing," he wrote:
A revolution in northern opinion must certainly take 
place after awhile followed by a change of policy ... I 
am for going in on the old track, electing our best men 
to office, & practically ignoring (as far as may be) all 
congressional usurpations. If we adopt the 
Congressional proposition of Amendment, our hands will 
be tied forever. If we merely submit, to what may be 
put on us, without our consent, we will be free, when 
the proper time comes, to insist on the restoration of 
all our rights.
22
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The passage of the First Reconstruction Act, on March 2,
1867 (and its subsequent expansion) proved Stuart wrong.
Under its provisions, the ex-Confederate states could not be
re-admitted to the Union without first adopting new state
constitutions, framed by delegates chosen in a biracial
election. Further, the new state government formed under the
constitution would have to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.
As a means of enforcing Radical policy in the South, the
region was divided into military districts, each under an
army commander. Virginia enjoyed the dubious distinction of
being at the top of the list, as Military District Number
23
One, under the command of General John Schofield.
The confidence in northern moderation Stuart evinced 
before the passage of the Act was gone by April 25, when he 
voiced his dismay in a letter to his bookseller, Frank S. 
Taylor:
Is there any hope for us poor downtrodden people of 
the South? It is hard that those of us who resisted the 
revolutionaries of the South, and only yielded to the 
inevitable exigencies by which we were surrounded, 
should now be the victims of the revolutionaries of the 
North.
I must confess that I have no bright hope of the 
future, and the utmost that I can expect is that the 
evil day may be postponed, until ... I shall have passed 
beyond the reach of the storm.
24
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This melancholy tone was short-lived, for Stuart was not 
destined to stay uninvolved in the political maneuvers taking 
place around him for very long. As plans went forth for 
electing delegates to the constitutional convention required 
by the Reconstruction Act, he and others like him began to 
form an alternative course of action that would culminate in 
the Conservative "New Movement," and give Stuart a key role 
in Virginia’s redemption.
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CHAPTER V
THE UNDERWOOD CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMITTEE OF NINE
The Republican party of Virginia convened in 
Richmond in April of 1867 to nominate delegates for the 
constitutional convention mandated by the Reconstruction Act. 
Radicals dominated the proceedings. The majority of the 
participants were blacks led by the Reverend James W. 
Hunnicutt, the white newspaper editor who had been a vocal 
opponent of secession in Fredericksburg before the war. 
Control of this party by its extreme left wing caused the 
greatest concern among moderate Republicans and Conservatives 
(that is, those white natives or long-time residents opposed 
to Radical policies). The Hunnicutt faction solidified its 
control at a later convention held in August. Conservatives 
were disappointed by the results of the October elections in 
which a majority of the delegates chosen for the
1
constitutional convention were Radicals of both races.
The convention met for the first time in Richmond, on
December 3, 1867. In the president's chair sat Judge John C.
Underwood, whom Virginius Dabney has called "a ... vicious
2
critic of all things Confederate.11 To be sure, Underwood 
was no lover of secessionists; they had driven him from the 
state in 1856 on account of his Unionist views. He returned 
in 1864 as judge of the United States District Court for 
Virginia. It was in this role that he refused to grant bail
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for Jefferson Davis when the former Confederate President was
brought before his court on charges of treason after the war.
For this action, the Petersburg Index utilized the full
resources of the alphabet to term His Honor an "absurd,
blasphemous, cowardly, devilish, empirical, fanatical,
3
ghoulish, horrible, ignorant, ... Yankeeish zero."
It was thus with a less-than-sterling reputation among 
Conservative white Virginians that Judge Underwood assumed 
direction of the convention which would bear his name, as 
would the constitution it created. Traditional studies of the 
convention have depicted the Radicals, particularly the black 
members, as illiterate political pawns who were severely 
lacking in parliamentary skills. This was certainly the 
contemporary viewpoint expressed by Conservative delegate 
Joseph A. Waddell, in a report of convention activities 
written for his Staunton Spectator:
Of course they [the black delegates] are uneducated 
and ignorant, and the idea of their undertaking to frame 
a State Constitution would be too ridiculous to be 
credited, if the spectacle were not presented to us 
daily in the capitol of Virginia ...
The white Radicals are a motley crew. Some of them 
have apparently little more intelligence than the 
negroes, and have doubtless come from the lowest ranks 
of the people ...
A Conservative looker-on is filled with indignation, 
disgust, and amusement all at one moment. I have seen 
several gentlemen from the North who have visited the 
Convention, and they seemed aghast at the spectacle.
4
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Alexander H. H. Stuart: shared a similarly low view of
the Radicals, delaring that this "hideous majority" was
mainly composed of "ignorant and excited Negroes, led by
greedy adventurers from the North, popularly known as
* carpetbaggers,1 and a few recreant natives, who were
designated * scalawags.'" He did note however that several
Conservative delegates (most of them young men with no prewar
government experience, who thus qualified under the test
5
oath) were "of the better class of citizens."
Recent scholarship has revealed a considerably different 
profile of the convention membership. Richard L. Hume’s 1978 
article in The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 
makes use of manuscript census records and other primary 
sources to determine the social backgrounds, political 
experience, and voting patterns of the delegates in a manner 
not previously undertaken. According to Hume's findings, 
sixty of the 105 delegates were Radicals (shirty-seven white, 
twenty-three black) and thirty-eight were Conservatives (all 
whites). Four whites and one black were nonaligned. The 
Conservatives were more wealthy, engaged in predominantly 
professional occupations, and appear to have included many 
former Whigs. The Radicals, by contrast, were primarily 
farmers and tradesmen, less affluent, and had proportionately 
less political experience. The black delegates, twelve of 
whom appear to have been former slaves, had very little 
political experience and were less well-off financially.
80
Hume determines, however, "that the typical black delegate, a
skilled laborer in his early forties in 1867 ... was not the
destitute, illiterate politician portrayed so often in
6
traditional accounts of Reconstruction."
The Underwood Constitution, hammered out after four
months of raucous, often bitter debate, was a triumph for the
Radicals. Some of its features were genuine reforms,
particularly the establishment of the first free public
school system in Virginia— an unfulfilled goal of Thomas
Jefferson. The document also called for the establishment of
a township system intended to democratize local government in
7
the Commonwealth, and for taxation according to wealth.
Whatever support these reforms might have enjoyed under 
different conditions was largely negated by the overwhelming 
disapproval which greeted the two most "objectionable" 
clauses of the Underwood Constitution. Through an expanded 
interpretation of, the provisions of the First Reconstruction 
Act, the constitution incorporated articles that required all 
Virginia voters to take a test oath swearing they had not 
taken part in the rebellion, and that banned all former 
Confederate soldiers, public officals, and known sympathizers 
from government offices. The voting population would thus be 
reduced to those few natives who qualified under the oath, 
some out-of-state whites who had migrated to Virginia, and, 
of course, blacks. According to figures cited by Stuart and
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other Conservatives, the test oath would force the expulsion
from public office of some 10,000 to 15,000 voters, while the
disfranchisement provision would result in the exclusion from
8
public office and jury service of 95% of all whites.
It was fear over just this sort of outcome that inspired 
the formation of the Conservative party in Virginia. During 
the first week of November, Stuart and leaders from the 
defunct Whig, Know-Nothing, and moderate Democratic factions 
met in Richmond to issue a call for a convention to rally 
their forces against the Radical threat. They styled 
themselves the "Executive Committee of the Conservative 
Party.” On December 11, 1867, eight days after the start of 
the Underwood Convention, leaders representing a cross- 
section of the Old Dominion*s political elite began their 
meeting by electing Stuart as their president. This was not 
unusual, considering his role in organizing the gathering and 
the large number of Whigs taking part in the proceedings. 
Stuart set the tone of the convention in his opening 
statement, which denounced the Underwood Constitution1s 
"objectionable" clauses:
We have met to appeal to the North not to permit the 
infliction of this disgrace upon us. Our rights may be 
wrested from us, but we will never submit to the rule of 
an alien and inferior race. We desire ... to perfect 
our organization so that all who desire that this shall 
continue to be a white man's government may be able to 
act in concert and by one vigorous and united effort 
save ourselves from ruin and disgrace.
9
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With the battle lines between the Radicals and Conservatives
now clearly drawn, both camps began the process of selecting
candidates for the anticipated August election that would
present the Underwood Consitution to the voters, as well as
choose state government officials. During the month of May,
yet another round of conventions chose candidates for the top
three elective offices in Virginia: governor, lieutenant
governor, and attorney general. The Radical slate was headed
by the current military governor, Henry H. Wells. Wells had
been installed by the military commander of Virginia, General
John Schofield, in the hope that he would be a moderating
influence on the Radical Republicans. Wells, however, soon
aligned himself with the extremists. His nomination angered
the Radical faction headed by James Hunnicutt, (whom Wells
had bested in the fight to bear the party's standard) and was
10
also opposed by the moderate Republican wing. The
Conservatives chose Colonel Robert E. Withers of Lynchburg as
their gubernatorial nominee. A physician and wounded
Confederate veteran, Withers was also editor of the Lynchburg
News. He was a former Whig and opposed to the emerging
ambitions of another, more famous Confederate officer,
11
General William Mahone.
Mahone's role in the political maneuvering during this 
period was pervasive; he was willing to back practically any 
candidate for governor who would support his plans to combine 
three southern Virginia railroads into one consolidated
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system under his control. At first he thought Wells would
turn out to be an ally in his schemes, but the governor's
later intrigues with rival railroads forced him to turn to
the Conservatives. Here too, Mahone was unable to get the
assurances he needed. Withers' refusal to cooperate meant
that either another candidate or another party would have to
be found to realize the General's political and personal 
12
goals.
During the summer campaign, the Radicals sought to
portray the Conservatives as elitists bent on perpetuating < s l
virtual caste system among whites, as well as denying blacks
their civil rights. They lauded their recently-framed
constitution as a guarantee of equitable government and their
13
party as the guardian of lower-and middle-class interests.
The Conservatives, on the other hand, focused on the issue of
race. Their rhetoric shunned the black vote, and exhorted
all white men, regardless of their prior party affiliation,
to rally around them in complete opposition to the Underwood 
14
Constitution. The ferocity of the debate alarmed General 
Schofield, who was convinced that a victory for either 
party, as they were then constituted, would settle nothing 
and only exacerbate tensions. Adopting the expedient that 
the state treasury did not contain sufficient funds for an 
election, he cancelled the scheduled August canvass and 
declared that Congress must appropriate the money. More
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delays resulted from reluctance on the part of the national
legislature to approve the allocation, primarily because the
extreme nature of the Underwood Constitution embarrassed many
15
Republican congressmen.
The victory of Ulysses S. Grant in the November, 1868
presidential election had a dramatic effect on the political
16
battle raging in Virginia. Although Grant was essentially a
moderate, the Radicals were not repudiated by the northern
electorate. Conservatives began to realize that if they were
to succeed in overcoming their opponents and regaining
control of their state, they must alter their stance. Stuart
in particular now believed that victory could only be assured
by accepting the Underwood Constitution, at least in part.
Convinced that a compromise was necessary to bring Virginia
out of her political and economic purgatory, he decided to
call for one in the press.
Relying on a pseudonym as he did with the "Madison"
letters, Stuart penned a communication to the Richmond
Dispatch using the name "Senex." After some initial
difficulty (the newspaper*s editor, opposed to Stuart*s
policies, wanted his name clearly associated with the letter)
it was published on Christmas Day, 1868; it also appeared in
17
the Richmond Whig. In it, Stuart alerted readers to the 
dangers of white disfranchisement that were inherent in the 
Underwood Constitution, most notably the test oath. He also 
admitted that problems could be expected to arise from the
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constitution's provision for black suffrage, but attempted to 
downplay the consequences.
Stuart sought to demonstrate to the white people of 
Virginia that while political equality for the freedmen might 
have repugnant features, stubborn opposition to it was not 
worth the sacrifice of the white franchise:
There is an old adage that "half a loaf is better 
than no bread," and I would respectfully ask, is ours 
not a case for the application of this proposition? Is 
it not better to surrender half that to lose all? Is it 
not better to take universal suffrage, with an exemption 
from disfranchisement ... than to have [it] forced upon 
us? After grievous travail of spirit, I have come to 
the conclusion that such is the dictate of prudence and 
common sense.
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The "Senex" article, observed Hamilton J. Eckenrode,
"created a profound impression, or rather, sensation. It met
the strong disapproval of almost the entire Conservative
press? indeed it required some courage to advocate the
acceptance of Negro suffrage, even when the advocate was so
well-known and esteemed as Mr. Stuart." The publication of
these sentiments for the first time openly proclaimed the
intention of Stuart and his colleagues to support the right
of blacks to vote in exchange for guarantees of the right of
whites to go to the polls unfettered by any past connections
19
to the Confederacy.
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As the year 1868 drew to a close, the Radicals still
supported their constitution and the black suffrage
provisions it contained. The Conservatives still officially
opposed both. Within the two parties, however, "moderate
groups were groping toward a common program: to ratify a
modified version of the proposed constitution that would
enfranchise Negroes without disqualifying former Confederates
20
and to elect an administration directed by their own kind."
After urging such a course with the publication of his
"Senex" letter, Alexander H. H. Stuart now proceeded to help
organize a Conservative "New Movement" to effect it.
Once again a group of Staunton leaders invited
Conservatives to gather in Richmond for a strategy session.
Meeting on December 31, they chose a delegation to journey to
Washington with the mission of stating their case for
compromise to Congress, and to enlist the support of
prominent northerners in and out of government. Stuart was
chosen to lead the group. Acompanying him were his brother-
in-law John B. Baldwin; James F. Johnston of Bedford County;
John L. Marye, Jr. of Fredericksburg; James Neeson of
Richmond; W. L. Owen of Halifax; Wyndham Robertson of
Washington County; John F. Slaughter of Lynchburg; and
William T. Sutherlin of Danville. The number of members
provided the name by which the delegation quickly became
21
known--the Committee of Nine.
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The Committee was overwhelmingly Whig in composition and
philosophy (Neeson was its only Democrat). Most of the
members had previous political experience, with Stuart and
Baldwin at the top of the list of former officeholders in
state and federal government. Robertson served as a Whig
in the House of Delegates and as governor of Virginia.
Sutherlin, like Stuart and Baldwin, was a delegate to the
1861 secession convention, where he voted against the May 4
ordinance and for the one of May 17. He later served in the
Confederate army, and provided sanctuary in his Danville home
for Jefferson Davis after the fall of Richmond in 1865.
Marye and Owen were delegates to the Underwood constitutional
convention (Owen, though a Republican, later joined with the
Conservatives), and Marye was the Conservative party’s
candidate for attorney general at the time he joined the
22
Committee of Nine.
In addition to being Whig in orientation, the Committee 
of Nine also reflected the interests of western Virginia in 
most of its membership. This combination did little to 
endear the group to unreconstructed Democrats like Henry A. 
Wise, who freely expressed his loathing for both the 
Committee and its goals. He was incensed when Stuart 
implied in a speech that Wise and Governor Wells had been 
brought into an alliance of sorts in their opposition to the 
New Movement. In a letter dated February 5, 1869, the former 
governor advised his old Know-Nothing adversary that "there
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are worse people than Wells to beware of--people who are not 
Wells[es] nor Wises— and you had better seek better company 
when you next visit Washington." Failure to do so "throws 
you necessarily into bad associations." Wise invoked the 
memory of the secession ordinance which both he and Stuart
23
had signed in sharing his "most fair and friendly" advice.
It is apparent from writings in later years that Wise
looked upon the Committee of Nine with nothing resembling a
"fair and friendly" spirit:
Usurpers they were and despicable Dupes ... Who were 
they? Nine gentlemen, who had no deputation of primary 
Meetings or Conventions, or call from any body of the 
people, except themselves. They were the oddest mixture 
of all past faith and were alike only in renouncing all 
creeds and in having no faith at all, and no motto save 
that of "Sauve que peut" [Save what you can]. In a 
word, they were the most unqualified and disqualified 
"Submissionists."
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Stuart, for his part, was condemned by Wise as "ready to gulp 
testh [sic] oaths ... with the Stomach of an ostrich 
swallowing stones."
25
The Radicals could not hope to match Henry A. Wise in 
his invective. They could, however, try to weaken or 
discredit the Nine’s position once they were in Washington. 
Wells himself led a group of black and white Radicals which 
followed Stuart’s delegation to offer their faction’s 
testimony in favor of the Underwood Constitution to Congress. 
Also scheduled to speak were moderate Republicans led by 
Franklin Stearns, who chaired the Virginia Conservative
89
Republican Committee. All three groups outlined their
positions before the House Reconstruction Committee and the
Judiciary Committee of the Senate during the month of 
26
January.
Because of its members1 ties to northern leaders and a
record of support for the Union before the war, the Committee
of Nine counted on having more potential allies than its
competitors. Typical of this support was the help offered by
Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune. His
editorials expressed sympathy for the aims of the Nine, and
Greeley himself advised Stuart of several key congressional
leaders who were "all right." He also urged the Committee to
approach President-elect Grant, who was thought to be
receptive to a compromise which would bring Virginia back
into the Union, so long as the requirements of the First
27
Reconstruction Act were met.
In their testimony before the Judiciary Committee, the
Nine implored Congress to remove from the Underwood
Constitution the clauses concerning the test oath and
disfranchisement. They also asked that sections pertaining
to the ownership of church property, the establishment of a
township system of local government, and taxes for public
schools be deleted. In defense of their requests, the
official statement of the group maintained:
that the least important [of the objectionable clauses] 
will be found to involve some grave public mischief or
90
injustice. Those included in our suggestion could not 
but plunge our state into civil anarchy and discord, and 
to disturb the general and growing harmony of the two 
races of our people, if not array them in deplorable 
hostility to one another.
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The Committee also had two private interviews with Grant, in
which, as Stuart recorded in his version of the events, "he
clearly indicated his sympathy with our movement." The Nine
also benefited from the decision of the Stearns Republican
group to endorse the Conservative position of opposition to
29
Wells and the Radicals.
Traditional Whig-Democratic rivalries colored the
opinions of many contemporary observers who followed the
actions of the Committee of Nine. L. Q. Washington was a
pro-southern journalist for the Washington, D.C. National
Intelligencer who maintained a voluminous correspondence with
Democrat Robert M. T. Hunter, the former states rights
activist and Confederate official. Washington wrote to
Hunter on January 31 that Stuart was "played out," and "might
have been effective twenty years ago." Yet in the same
letter he admitted that the Nine had "done good more by the
proposition than by their way of working it. They have won
over a few leading Republicans. They have made allies of
30
Grant and Schofield [by now acting secretary of war]."
Another prominent Republican moderate who cooperated 
with the Nine was Gilbert C. Walker, a northern businessman 
who had settled in Norfolk during the war. Far from being
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seen as a "carpetbagger" by most Virginians, Walker enjoyed
considerable prestige among Conservatives, as well within his
own party. A confidant and business partner of Mahone,
Walker was brought to Stuart’s attention by John L. Marye in
a letter that asserted the transplanted northerner "has been
a decided, out-spoken foe of the Underwood Constitution, and
would act energetically and cordially in favor of our
movement." Walker’s correspondence with Mahone reveals a
plan to unite with the Nine in order to secure the backing of
all the moderate elements within the political spectrum, with
31
Walker as the compromise candidate for governor.
This is, in fact, what transpired. A new Republican
nominating convention held in Petersburg on March 9 again put
Wells at the top of the ticket, but Mahone operatives scored
a decisive victory by securing the nomination of Dr. J. D.
Harris, a black, for lieutenant governor. This move promised
to deprive Wells of many white votes. Disaffected convention
delegates promptly nominated a "True" Republican slate with
Walker as the candidate for governor. In the midst of this
Republican cleavage, President Grant on April 7 sent his
first message to Congress, in which he asked for passage of a
law permitting an election in Virginia within the next two
months. Grant indicated that "if this should be desirable, I
would recommend that a separate vote be taken on such parts
[of the Underwood Constitution] as may be thought 
32
expedient."
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Congress complied with Grant's request. A bill passed
on April 10 gave the President authority to call an election
in Virginia, and to submit the constitution and any
designated clauses separate from each other. Encouraged by
this turn of events, the Conservative slate headed by Withers
resigned en masse at the end of April. The party's Executive
Committee fell short of formally endorsing Walker for
governor, but the withdrawal of the Withers ticket, in the
words of one historian of the period, "was tantamount to an
acceptance of Walker as the candidate around whom all
33
Virginia Conservatives could rally."
Grant responded by calling for an election in Virginia
on July 6, 1869. He had delayed the announcement in order to
observe the Conservative reaction to the Congressional edict
of April 10, while also waiting for the Senate to adjourn.
His proclamation provided for separate consideration of the
test oath and disfranchisement clauses, but made no such
provision for the township section, which Grant had privately
admitted to Stuart was the feature of the Underwood
Constitution he found most disturbing. The President
attributed his decision to deny consideration of this clause
to fear expressed by members of his cabinet that Virginians
would, in voting on the issue, be in a position to defeat not
only the organizational plan, but the free public school
34
system incorporated within it.
93
Again an election campaign got under way. Again Wells
and the Radical Republicans took to the stump to argue for
complete acceptance of the Underwood Constitution and
political equality for all races. The difference this time
was that the Conservatives, throwing their support to the
Walker "True Republican" ticket, also appealed to blacks for
their votes. Hardliners like Henry A. Wise and William Smith
refused to abandon hope for an exclusively white party, but
moderates of the Stuart stamp made vigorous entreaties to the
freedmen to stand with them against the Yankees. It was a
striking turnaround in policy for Stuart and his fellow
Conservatives, who had so recently rejected the notion of
courting the black vote. The scent of possible victory
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doubtless influenced their decision.
Stuart had already expressed the rationale for his 
change in position in a letter to Professor John B. Minor of 
the University of Virginia. After a chance encounter at the 
Charlottesville train station. Minor had asked Stuart to send 
him an expanded commentary on the need to approve the 
expurgated Underwood Constitution. Stuart complied, and 
Minor was so impressed with its contents that he sent it to 
the Richmond Enquirer and several other papers for 
publication, asking for Stuart’s permission after the fact.
In this letter, Stuart pointed out that Grant's good faith 
effort to accommodate the wishes of the Conservatives 
deserved vindication. He also suggested that any flaws still
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present in the constitution could be dealt with once Virginia 
was operating again under a normal system of government:
It is true that we will not get all that we expected 
to get, yet I think it is obvious that ... we get a 
great deal. The Constitution, even when expurgated, 
will be a very objectionable instrument, but is 
certainly much better than in its original form, and, in 
my judgement, it is definitely preferable to no 
constitution at all. We can at least live under it for 
a time, with that certain assurance that after awhile 
[sic] we can greatly improve it ... It seems to me that 
in casting their votes under the Presidents 
proclamation, the people are called upon to decide where 
the political power of the state is to rest hereafter, 
and who are to control her destinies in the future.
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It late June it was learned that the military commander
of Virginia, General E. R. S. Canby, intended to issue an
order requiring all elected legislators to take the "iron
clad oath" before being granted their seats. The
Conservative leadership was divided by this move. Candidates
who could not qualify considered dropping out of the race,
while other Conservatives felt that had been hoodwinked.
Before the issue could develop into a genuine crisis, Stuart
and his old congressional opponent John F. Lewis issued a
private appeal to President Grant to intercede. Grant forbid
37
Canby1s action, and the election proceeded as planned.
The people of the Commonwealth went to the polls July 6, 
1869 amid little fanfare and virtually no violence. The 
results were a resounding success for the Conservative/True 
Republican forces, with Walker winning 119,535 votes to the 
101,204 garnered by Wells. The Underwood Constitution was
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adopted minus the test oath and disfranchisement clauses,
which were each defeated by margins of about forty thousand
votes. Walker’s 54% of the ballots cast represented a larger
margin of victory than that won in a popular election by any
previous governor of Virginia. The Conservatives took firm
control of the General Assembly, plus a majority of
congressional seats. Walker’s post-election journey from
Norfolk to Richmond the following day had the air of a
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coronation procession.
To what extent does Alexander H. H. Stuart deserve
credit for the Conservative victory that made possible
Virginia's redemption? Scholarly assessments of his impact
on Reconstruction in the Commonwealth have ranged from
effusive praise to undistinguished mention of his
involvement. Early in this century, Hamilton Eckenrode
portrayed him as one of the most influential figures in the
state during the period 1865-1870. In the 1970s, Jack P.
Maddex, Jr. considered his role to have been "greatly
exaggerated." Most of the other historians who have studied
Virginia during this period have assigned Stuart varying
degrees of responsibility for the Conservative victory of
1869. Those who generally deprecate his level of
participation point to Mahone, Walker, and their associates
as the primary movers and shakers, with Stuart at best
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receiving credit for a secondary role.
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In fact, Stuart assumed significant positions of 
leadership at key points in the Reconstruction process. His 
prominent place in the councils of the Conservative 
leadership qualify him as a founding father of that party.
As president of the Conservative convention and chairman of 
the Committee of Nine, he gave outward expression to his goal 
of securing Virginia's readmission to the Union on the most 
favorable terms possible. His published commentaries and 
private correspondence marked him as a leader who evolved 
from a staunch foe of universal suffrage to a champion of 
moderation when he determined that blind opposition was 
pointless.
It was as chairman of the Committee of Nine that Stuart 
contributed most to the rise of the Conservatives in 
Virginia. The delegation's main success in Washington was 
showing Congress and the Grant administration that 
Conservative white Virginians were devoted to reshaping the 
state's government and economy to meet the expectations of 
northern opinion. In return they lobbied for assurances that 
northern capital would invest in the Whig-inspired program of 
industrialization and reform they envisioned, and that the 
Commonwealth would be able to regain control of her own 
destiny. While the Walker faction of the Republican party 
doubtless carried considerable, even decisive clout, they 
acknowledged the influence of Stuart's group by joining with 
them, rather than pursuing an independent course.
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Once victory was achieved, Alexander H. H. Stuart
returned to Staunton, satisfied that he had played an
important part in an honorable cause. He remained there,
practicing law and attending to his many business interests,
until he was again elected to the House of Delegates in 1873.
It was in the body where his career in public office began
that he took part in his last great political battle, the
40
struggle over the public debt of Virginia.
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CHAPTER VI
THE LAST ACT: STUART'S CAREER AFTER RECONSTRUCTION
Alexander H. H. Stuart never again attracted the wide 
public attention he had received as architect of the New 
Movement and the Committee of Nine. This is not to say that 
he retired from politics entirely. He still maintained a 
successful law practice in Staunton, and tended to his 
numerous business interests. This work, coupled with his 
continuing influence within the Conservative party, afforded 
many opportunities to observe and participate in the intense, 
often vituperative political debates that took place during 
the two decades after Gilbert C. Walker's election in 1869. 
This last phase of Stuart's career in public life was spent 
in pursuing the Whiggish economic and social tenets of the 
Conservative message. Chief among these was the settlement 
of the Commonwealth's pre-Civil War debt.
To understand Stuart's role in this period, it is 
necessary to review briefly the evolution of the state debt. 
Even though the internal improvements initiatives proposed by 
Stuart were defeated in the 1830s, Virginia had invested 
heavily in such projects by 1861, primarily through bond 
issues. The state attempted to honor its debts during the 
war, despite the severe economic disruption it caused.
During Reconstruction, the Baldwin legislature continued this 
policy by passing a law enabling holders of prewar bonds to
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receive full payment of the interest to which they were
entitled, including that which had accrued during the war.
The law also applied to bonds issued by the Pierpont
government after West Virginia had become an independent
state. This funding policy outlived the Baldwin legislature,
and remained in force while other political considerations
diverted attention away from the debt question for the rest
1
of Reconstruction.
Virginia was readmitted to the Union in January of 1870, 
having fulfilled the requirements of the First Reconstruction 
Act. Governor Walker hoped to bring about the economic 
recovery of the state, while also solidifying his political 
position. Unfortunately, the two most significant pieces of 
legislation he championed produced exactly the opposite 
result. The Funding Act of 1871 committed the Commonwealth 
to full repayment of its $45,000,000 debt, most of which was 
owed to northern and foreign investors. The Act authorized 
the issuance of bonds at six per cent interest, with coupons 
that were acceptable for the payment of all state taxes. 
One-third of the debt was covered by interest-bearing 
certificates, with the intention that this portion would 
become the responsibility of West Virginia. Several scholarly 
studies, most notably Charles C. Pearson’s The Readjuster 
Movement in Virginia, have shown that Walker greatly 
overestimated the financial resources and potential of the 
state in pushing for passage of this law. The Funding Act
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served to polarize politics within Virginia; its supporters
became known as "Funders," while proponents of partial
2
repudiation of the debt were styled "Readjusters."
The Governor expected a large share of the revenue
needed to reduce the debt to come from the sale of state
railroad assets, which he hoped to accomplish through another
law enacted by the General Assembly at his urging. This
action was vigorously opposed by Mahone, since it allowed
well-financed northern lines, like the Pennsylvania Central,
to acquire much of the state-controlled rail stock at bargain
prices. The resulting battle for votes in the Assembly
resulted in large scale bribery and fraud on both sides; in
such a contest, the superior resources of the northern
corporations enabled them to win. The state lost much more
than it gained in this transaction, since the proceeds were
far below what it had actually invested. The affair also
embittered Mahone, who felt, with some justification, that
3
Walker had betrayed him.
The Funding Act and the railroad divestitures were 
unpopular with many Virginians, especially those who saw both 
actions as ploys concocted by speculators and brokers to 
increase their own fortunes. Farmers in the southwestern 
portion of the state stood to gain nothing and to lose much 
by the tax burden the Act promised to create. In the next 
state election, only twenty-six delegates were returned to
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office; the rest were victims of their constituents1
4
suspicions about the Commonwealth’s financial stability In 
light of these events, many Conservatives questioned whether 
the alliance they had made with the Walker "True Republicans" 
in 1869 was still viable.
Stuart apparently did not share these misgivings. Late 
in 1869 he conspired with John L. Marye, Jr., Thomas 
Flournoy, and other influential Whig members of the 
Conservative coalition, to create an independent movement, 
known as the "Walker party," that would function as the 
organizational base of support for the Governor. Some former 
Confederates cooperated with the group, including Mahone (who 
appeared unwilling to burn all of his bridges with Walker). 
Public revelation of this organization soon led to its 
dissolution. Despite his participation in this attempted
5
coup, Stuart remained active in the Conservative leadership.
Stuart, like most of the Whigs within the Conservative 
party, supported the Funding Act as a necessary measure to 
preserve Virginia's honor and credit. Although he was not a 
member of the General Assembly when the Funding Act was 
passed, he defended it in later years. He admitted that the 
law contained flaws, but maintained that opponents of the 
measure "were most ignorant of its objects, its principles, 
and its provisions." Stuart did not believe that "proud­
spirited Virginians" should contemplate anything but full and
6
honorable funding of the debt. After he was elected to the
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House of Delegates in 1873, he continued to support funding
policies. Becoming chairman of the Committee on Finance, he
worked to increase revenues by identifying businesses which
were not paying adequate taxes and by searching for new
subjects of taxation. Yet it has also been suggested that
Stuart, like many of his fellow lawmakers, was amenable to
the wishes of railroad lobbies in the consideration of 
7
legislation.
At one point Stuart contemplated a scheme for dealing
with the debt situation that was similar to his experience
with the Committee of Nine. He drafted a letter entitled
"Some Suggestions About the Public Debt Question, and a New
Mode of Effecting Settlement," apparently written for
publication around 1880, which reviewed the history of the
New Movement and its successes, and suggested that the time
was right to adopt a similar course of action. Stuart*s
idea was that businessmen from around the state should meet
with the bondholders to determine equitable terms of
settlement, and then push for acceptance of the arrangement
in the next election. However, Stuart did not pursue the
8
matter beyond setting his ideas down on paper.
Stuart took to the stump in 1873 for James Lawson Kemper 
in the latter*s successful campaign for governor. During the 
four years of Kemper's term, Stuart continued to argue for 
full funding of the debt, although the governor he helped
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elect proposed a readjustment to ease the burden on the
state's finances. The end of his career in the General
Assembly, indeed in public office entirely, coincided with
the election of Frederick W. M. Holliday to succeed Kemper in 
9
1877.
Politics was not the only thing that occupied Stuart's
time and energies in the last twenty years of his life. In
1871 he was elected to the Board of the Peabody Education
Fund. Founded by a wealthy northerner, George Peabody, the
fund sought to promote "intellectual, moral, and industrial
education among the young of the more destitute portion of
the Southern and Southwestern States of the Union." Ulysses
S. Grant, Hamilton Fish, and William Cabell Rives were among
the board members with whom Stuart served for eighteen 
10
years. He authored a report for the Peabody Fund on 
education for blacks in the South, an exhaustive document 
that embodied the spirit of social order and harmony that was 
characteristic of his Whig background. Stuart summarized 
education in America, as well as the evolution of blacks in 
slavery and emancipation, noting that "a race numbering five 
millions of souls was elevated from the degradation of 
slavery to the high position of citizenship of a great 
republic, with all its precious rights and weighty 
responsibilities." Since their previous condition of 
servitude had done nothing to prepare them as citizens, 
education was essential. Stuart also noted that
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improvements in learning for blacks would instill in them the
necessity for repaying the public debts of their state— an
11
artful expression of his Funder/Conservative philosophy.
Another of Stuart’s longstanding educational commitments
was that of visitor of the University of Virginia. Governor
Kemper first appointed him to the board of visitors in 1876,
and he was elected rector. Holliday reappointed him in 1880,
but politics intervened, and Stuart was ousted during his
second term by Readjuster Governor William Cameron. When
Fitzhugh Lee succeeded Cameron in 1886, he persuaded Stuart
to return to the post, which he held until shortly before his
death. One of Stuart’s proudest achievements as rector was
securing a $50,000 gift for the University from another noted
12
northern philanthropist, William W. Corcoran.
Stuart was 80 years old when he retired from public life
in 1887. For several years he had worked on his narrative of
the Reconstruction period and the exploits of the Committee of
Nine for the Virginia Historical Society, of which he was a
past president. Anxious to see the volume in print, he wrote
to the society’s sitting president to advise that time was of
the essence. "As there are but four or five of the members
of the Committee now living, it would be desirable that it
13
should appear before any more of us drop off." The 
narrative was published later that year. It was generally
110
well-received, although some of the principals in the story
14
felt Stuart had exaggerated his role in the New Movement.
Stuart's wife of fifty-two years died in 1887, adding to
the personal heartache which the deaths of six of his nine
children had visited upon him. Stuart himself was repeatedly
plagued by illness, though his mental capacity and the volume
of his correspondence were undiminished. By 1890 most of his
acquaintances, friends and enemies alike, were gone. Writing
in June of that year to a former law clerk whom he had
befriended in his days as a circuit-riding lawyer, the frail
old Whig reflected on how alone he felt:
Most of my contemporaries have passed away, and the 
circle of the associates of my early and active life has 
been sadly narrowed by death. There is not a lawyer now 
living in Rockbridge, Augusta, or Rockingham who was at 
the bar when I commenced the practice of law. I am now 
a stranger in the place of my nativity and my active 
career. Strange faces greet me at every turn.
15
Stuart was at work on another project for the Virginia
Historical Society, a biographical sketch of his father, when
he was stricken with influenza. Death came within four days,
on February 13, 1891. The Department of the Interior
observed a thirty-day period of mourning, and testimonials
were offered in his memory. Newspapers eulogized him by
16
declaring his passing to signal the end of an era. What 
had in fact ended was the life and career of a truly 
remarkable Virginian.
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CONCLUSIONS
Throughout his career, Alexander Hugh Holmes Stuart 
personified the spirit of the Whig party. Few men ever 
maintained a more steadfast devotion to a political 
philosophy, especially during such a period of turbulence and 
shifting loyalties as existed in Antebellum America. 
Recognition of this relationship between Stuart and Whiggery 
is essential if one is to understand and assess his record.
Stuart remained a Whig even when the party he 
represented carried another name. Know-Nothing, Unionist, 
Conservative, Funder— all were labels that illustrated the 
evolution of the political debate in Virginia during the 
latter nineteenth century. For Stuart, these organizations 
were merely vehicles for expression of a system of government 
and set of principles formulated in the 1830s and maintained 
over five decades. As a Whig he argued for sectional 
cooperation, industrialization and internal improvements, and 
direction of government by a politically astute elite. He 
called for the same things regardless of his party's name.
In order to articulate his views, Stuart became a 
politician in the purest sense--a person experienced in the 
art and science of government. The appropriateness of this 
definition may be seen in the difference between his public 
statements and behind-the-scenes activities. In his many 
published letters, reports, and speeches, Stuart marshaled
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facts and figures with the precision of a mathematician. His
historical references and analysis of government were often
excruciatingly detailed. As a political organizer, however,
he prefered to eschew the formalities and specifics of the
political process. His greatest success came when he was
able to bypass the normal channels of government, and employ
what one historian has called "devious and conspiratorial"
1
tactics.
Such an appraisal is rather pejorative, but not entirely 
without foundation. Stuart certainly possessed considerable 
powers of intellect and oratory, and he could point to a 
distinguished record in public office. Why did he never run 
for Governor, or United States Senator, the traditional holy 
grails for aspiring politicos in the Old Dominion? Some of 
his correspondence suggests that he did consider bids for 
both offices, though these plans never materialized into 
actual campaigns. There were several reasons for this.
First, as a Whig, Stuart belonged to the perennnial second- 
place party in Virginia. Capturing the governorship only 
twice in twenty years, and never attaining a presidential 
majority, the Whigs were usually unable to prevail in 
statewide elections. Stuart's election victories were 
regional, involving constituencies based on his home area of 
Augusta County. This was true for the General Assembly seats 
he won, and for his two congressional efforts. Stuart could 
read the political landscape, and no doubt could calculate
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with reasonable accuracy the probability of his winning votes
outside the Whig stronghold of Augusta. Under the
circumstances, a successful gubernatorial campaign seemed
unlikely. The Senate was at best a remote possibility,
because of the Democratic majority in the General Assembly,
which elected Senators from Virginia throughout Stuart's
life. Again, his estimation of the chances of victory ruled
out running for this office.
Most importantly, Stuart seemed to prefer the relative
freedom offered by working out of the limelight. Some of
Stuart's contemporaries noted this behind-the-scenes aspect
of his personality, particularly his old colleague from the
Committee of Nine, Wyndham Robertson:
Stuart— the wisest perhaps of us all— would always 
mix with his wisdom a cunning that constantly weakened 
his influence— and so unnecessarily often. He seemed to 
prefer succeeding, even in a good cause capable of 
standing on its own merits, still by some indirection.
2
Robertson mused that if Stuart had only controlled this
tendency towards "indirection," he could have become "a power
3
that would have been felt thro* the land."
Whatever the means he chose to advance his causes,
Stuart adhered to conservative Whig values. For much of his 
career, it seemed that he was fated to be part of losing 
causes: first the demise of Whiggery, then that of the Know- 
Nothings, and finally the failure of his eleventh-hour 
efforts to forestall secession. His Funder stance on the
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state debt, so firmly rooted in his Whig background, also 
succumbed in time to the opposing Readjuster forces. In 
retrospect, the Whig message espoused by Stuart in the 
nineteenth century has been realized to a great degree during 
the twentieth. Virginia, for so long a predominantly 
agricultural state, has evolved into the sort of diversified 
industrial and technological marketplace forseen by the 
Whigs.
Thomas Carlyle once observed that HThe history of the 
world is but the biography of great men." This definition, 
somewhat out of favor in the era of the social historian, 
nevertheless recognizes the special contributions to the 
record of the past made by men— and women— who have emerged 
from the mainstream. Such a man was Alexander H. H. Stuart. 
Although he did not receive, nor perhaps desire, the fame 
achieved by many of his contemporaries, his contributions to 
Virginia and to the nation were no less sincere, no less 
valuable. Stuart’s own words best describe the principles by 
which he sought to live his life:
There can be no nobler spectacle presented than that 
of an honorable man, standing as it were alone, 
breasting the storm of popular passion and prejudice.
Let your rule through life be to do what you believe 
right, without regard to the clamor of the public; and 
after the passions of the hour have passed away you will 
enjoy the richest of all rewards— the confidence of your 
countrymen and the consciousness of duty faithfully 
performed.
4
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